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Abstract 
 
 
Sympathy for the Poor, Resentment of the Rich, and their Political Consequences 
 
by 
Spencer Piston 
 
 
 
Co-Chairs: Vincent L. Hutchings and Arthur Lupia 
 
 
 
In the midst of a large and widening gap between the poor and the rich in the United States, 
many scholars and political observers argue that Americans are tolerant of economic inequality. I 
argue, to the contrary, that Americans are unhappy with the fact that the poor have so little while 
the rich have so much, and that these attitudes shape their political behavior and public opinion. 
First I raise questions about the evidence base for this conventional understanding of American 
reactions to economic inequality; for example, some scholars rely on complicated survey 
questions about abstract concepts that Americans rarely use. Next, I show that on balance, 
Americans believe the poor to have too little, and accordingly view them with sympathy; the 
rich, meanwhile, are viewed to have too much, and are therefore targets of resentment. 
Moreover, sympathy for the poor and the rich underpin support for downwardly redistributive 
policies, at least when the groups affected by the policies are clear. Finally, I find that Americans 
seek to reward candidates who help the poor, and punish candidates who help the rich, in the 
voting booth. Taken together, these results show that contrary to many accounts, Americans are 
	   xi	  
opposed to increasing economic inequality, and they attempt to mitigate economic inequality 
when forming policy opinions and selecting candidates for public office.
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Chapter One  
 
Introduction 
 
 
  
 This dissertation examines public opinion in an age of widespread – and growing – 
economic inequality. Many scholars and political pundits claim that the American public is 
tolerant of economic inequality. To the contrary, I argue that on balance, Americans are opposed 
to economic inequality; furthermore, they attempt to mitigate economic inequality when 
selecting candidates for public office and when forming their opinion about public policy. 
 Existing research, as discussed in Chapter 2, typically approaches this topic by either 
examining responses to survey questions about inequality or downward redistribution or 
examining responses to questions about redistributive policies. But I argue that these approaches 
are insufficient. Questions about the abstract concepts of “inequality” and “redistribution” are 
too complicated and abstract for most ordinary Americans, while questions about policy opinions 
cannot by themselves demonstrate why Americans hold the policy opinions they do.  
 Accordingly, I employ a different strategy, examining attitudes toward two class groups 
at the extremes of the economic distribution: the poor and the rich. I next examine the political 
consequences of these attitudes, meeting individuals on their own terms rather than assuming 
they employ the same concepts as intellectual elites. In Chapter 3, I draw on research in social 
psychology to develop competing theoretical expectations about the nature and effects of 
attitudes toward the poor and the rich.  
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 Next, I conduct a series of empirical tests. I begin by developing and validating survey 
measures. Next, I collect and analyze original survey data using these questions, and supplement 
these analyses with an examination of American National Election Studies data over time. 
Finally, my research includes a survey experiment in order to obtain analytical leverage on 
questions of causation.  
 Shifting the approach from questions about abstract concepts such as “inequality” and 
“redistribution” to questions about what individuals think about these specific groups – the poor 
and the rich – yields findings that challenge extant accounts of American views about economic 
inequality. In particular, the findings of this more realistic approach suggest that ordinary 
Americans are more opposed to economic inequality than many scholars have suggested, 
although they do not put it in those terms.  
 I find in Chapter 4 that on balance, Americans believe the poor to have too little, and 
accordingly view them with sympathy; the rich, meanwhile, are viewed to have too much, and 
are therefore targets of resentment. In Chapter 5, I show that Americans seek to reward 
candidates who help the poor, and punish candidates who help the rich, in the voting booth. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I argue that sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich also help 
provide the solution to a puzzle that has bedeviled many scholars: why downwardly 
redistributive welfare state programs, even those that appear to exclusively benefit the poor, are 
so popular among the American public. In sum, contrary to conventional accounts of American 
indifference, opposition to economic inequality powerfully shapes vote choice and public 
opinion in the United States.  
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 One might ask, if Americans are sympathetic to the poor and resentful of the rich, why is 
there not more public support for downward redistribution? But such a question would rely on an 
errant premise: that the public rarely supports downwardly redistributive policies. In fact, 
decades of research by political scientists and sociologists have shown that support for 
downwardly redistributive policies is more common than is often believed. For example, 
majorities of Americans support not only inclusive welfare programs (for which everyone is 
eligible) such as Social Security but also means-tested programs (for which one has to 
demonstrate a lack of means to be eligible) such as Supplemental Security Income, Head Start, 
and the Earned Income Tax Credit. Political scientists have often wondered why such programs 
are so popular: my research reveals that sympathy for the poor is an important piece of this 
puzzle, one that has been previously overlooked. 
 Of course, some downwardly redistributive policies are relatively unpopular. For 
example, there is substantial opposition to what is commonly known as “welfare,” due in large 
part to another group-based attitude: racial prejudice. But it is also true that non-trivial 
proportions of Americans do support welfare, and I find that their support is in large part driven 
by sympathy for the poor. Moreover, in other cases opposition to downwardly redistributive 
policies, such as the estate tax, is largely a function of ignorance; Americans are often unaware 
who pays the cost – and who reaps the benefits – of the policies. When Americans are made 
aware of the distributive consequences, sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich are 
activated, increasing support for downward redistribution.  
 In addition, I provide evidence that these class group attitudes are genuine, rather than 
fleeting responses based on top-of-the-head considerations. First, and most importantly, the class 
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group attitudes predict vote choice, a real-world, politically consequential behavior. Second, the 
attitudes predict policy opinion, and both cross-national and within-U.S. studies show that policy 
opinion matters; it affects public policy, and concomitantly distributional outcomes. Third, an 
additional set of analyses suggests that the responses to the class group attitude questions are 
unaffected by social desirability pressures. Fourth, and finally, responses to the class group 
attitude questions are stable over time. 
 In sum, the findings of this project contribute to a vibrant debate about the extent to 
which Americans are tolerant of “inequality” or opposed to “redistribution.” While Americans 
do not often use these concepts, they do on balance believe that the poor have less than they 
deserve, and therefore view the poor with sympathy. They also believe, on average, that the rich 
have more than they deserve, and therefore view the rich with resentment. Furthermore, these 
attitudes lead Americans to support candidates, and policies, that benefit the poor, and to oppose 
candidates and policies that benefit the rich. Given that economic inequality shows no signs of 
slowing down in the midst of the recovery from the recent recession, the findings raise an 
important question: why are government policies so often out of step with public opinion, 
punishing the poor and rewarding the rich?  
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Chapter Two  
 
Previous Research: Public Opinion about Inequality and Redistribution 
  
  
 In this chapter, I first argue that while many scholars believe that Americans are 
approving of – or at minimum, tolerant of – inequality, the evidence for this belief is weak. 
Second, while many think that Americans disapprove of government-led redistribution, the 
survey research actually supports the opposing view, with some important exceptions.  
  
American Views of Economic Inequality 
 Both the income gap and the wealth gap between the poor and the rich in the United 
States are increasing, and they have been for decades (Page and Jacobs 2009; Soss, Hacker, and 
Mettler 2007). How have Americans responded? As sociologist Leslie McCall (2013) notes, the 
belief that “Americans simply don’t care about economic inequality” is the “dominant” 
understanding in both scholarly and media accounts. As an example of this understanding of 
American political culture, consider the following claim from political scientists Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady (2012): “Americans are most definitely not economic egalitarians. In contrast 
to their embrace of equality of political influence is their willingness to condone inequalities in 
economic rewards.” The authors go on to describe the American public’s stance as a “rejection 
of economic equality” and “an endorsement of economic inequality.” Economists Alesina, Di 
Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) concur: “Americans are willing to tolerate quite large disparities 
in wealth as long as they perceive that wealth is the result of effort and that everyone can make it 
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if enough effort and talent is devoted to the task.” Media accounts also reinforce this 
conventional wisdom.1  
 The empirical basis for this contention is scant, however. Some point to continuing 
economic inequality itself as evidence for American tolerance of a wide gap between the poor 
and the rich. Hochschild (1981),2 for example, writes, “the American poor apparently do not 
support the downward redistribution of wealth. The United States does not now have, and 
seldom ever has had, a political movement among the poor seeking greater economic 
equality…never has the poorer majority of the population, not to speak of the poorest minority, 
voted itself out of its economic disadvantage.” But this argument wrongly assumes a one-to-one 
correspondence between public opinion and political outcomes, ignoring the role of other factors 
such as institutions. To understand the problem with this argument, consider government 
spending on foreign aid; it is higher than most Americans would prefer, and has been for 
decades. The majority does not always rule; indeed, the majority does not always create a social 
movement. We therefore cannot reasonably infer public opinion from political outcomes. 
 Other scholars examine public opinion data rather than political outcomes. But some, 
particularly economists, do so by analyzing attitudes about subjects that are not directly related 
to economic inequality. These researchers examine a variety of factors, such as happiness 
(Alesina, DiTella, and MacCulloch 2004), beliefs about economic mobility (Benabou and Ok 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The following are examples: “[T]he U.S. has a pretty high tolerance for inequality.” (New York 
Times Magazine. “The Inequality Conundrum.” Roger Lowenstein. June 10, 2007.) “[T]he gap 
between the rich and poor is bigger than in any other advanced country, but most people are 
unconcerned. (The Economist. “The Rich, the Poor, and the Growing Gap Between Them.” June 
17, 2006.)  
2 Hochschild also examines public opinion data and conducts interviews with fourteen people, 
eventually concluding that the American public is ambivalent about, rather than tolerant of, 
economic inequality. 
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2001), attributions for economic success (Alesina and Glaeser 2004), and the tendency to support 
left- or right-wing parties (Piketty 1995). While these studies have made valuable contributions, 
the inferences they make about American tolerance for economic inequality rely on indirect 
evidence. Levels of happiness, for example, are not the same thing as tolerance for economic 
inequality. Moreover, it is possible to believe economic mobility to be high and still disapprove 
of the widening gap between the poor and the rich. I concur with McCall (2013), therefore, that 
much of this research “takes for granted that Americans are sanguine about economic 
opportunity and tolerant of income inequality, but it does so without actually probing about 
perceptions of inequality itself.” 
 Among those scholars who do analyze survey questions about topics directly related to 
economic inequality and government-led redistribution, interpretations of the data vary widely. 
Some interpret the distribution of survey responses as support for the claim that Americans are 
either tolerant of or ambivalent about economic inequality, as in the case of Schlozman, Verba, 
and Brady’s contention referenced above (see also Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986). 
But other researchers examine responses to similar questions and reach the opposite 
interpretation. For example, Page and Jacobs’ (2009) analysis of survey data concludes that 
“most Americans are well aware of the extreme and rising inequality that has developed since 
the 1970s…Americans are not happy about this. Most want income and wealth to be more 
evenly distributed” (see also McCall 2013).  
 It is difficult to adjudicate between these competing perspectives, particularly as scholars 
on both sides of the debate often rely on complicated survey questions that ask respondents about 
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abstract concepts such as “inequality” and “redistribution.”3 These concepts take considerable 
effort to grapple with even for those intellectuals who make their living doing so (e.g., 
Hochschild 1981; Rae and Yates 1981). Indeed, and perhaps for this reason, findings presented 
below suggest that the concepts of “inequality” and “redistribution” are rarely an important 
component of the “toolkit” (Swidler 1986) Americans use to make sense of economic issues in 
the United States. 
 A final set of scholars (e.g., Hochschild 1981; Newman and Jacobs 2010; Page and 
Jacobs 2009) examine responses to survey questions about policy attitudes in order to assess 
American opinion as the gap between the poor and the rich continues to widen. Again 
interpretations vary, depending in part on which policy questions are emphasized. Those who 
believe Americans to be supportive of economic inequality often cite public opinion about 
welfare and estate tax repeal, which are relatively unpopular. Meanwhile, those who believe 
Americans to be opposed to economic equality point to public opinion about government 
spending on the poor, increased taxes on the rich, and specific policy programs such as 
Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Head Start, all of which are 
relatively popular.  
 In my view, the problem with this approach is both larger than and prior to the pitfalls 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Examples: “Do you think that our government should or should not redistribute wealth by 
heavy taxes on the rich?” (Hochschild 1981, pg. 18); “Some people say that incomes should be 
completely equal, with every family making roughly the same amount of money; others say that 
things should stay about the same as they are now; and still others think incomes should be less 
equal than they are now. Ideally do you think there should be…” (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 
2012; from Kluegel and Smith 1986); “Do you feel that the distribution of money and wealth in 
this country today is fair, or do you feel that the money and wealth in this country should be 
more evenly distributed among a larger percentage of the people?” (Page and Jacobs 2009); “Do 
you agree or disagree: Inequality continues to exist because it benefits the rich and powerful” 
(McCall 2013). 
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associated with selective emphasis. The problem is that examining the distribution of responses 
to policy questions tells us what public opinion is but does not tell us what public opinion means 
(n.b., Kinder and Sanders 1996). Opinion about a given policy might be driven by a number of 
factors in addition to, or instead of, reactions to the widening gap between the poor and the rich. 
For example, citizens might form their policy opinions by taking cues from political elites 
sharing their partisanship (Bartels 2008). Therefore, I argue that in order to understand American 
opinion about economic inequality, it is insufficient to examine the distribution of policy 
opinions: we also need to know why Americans take the policy positions they take. 
 In this vein, both Bartels (2008) and McCall (2013; see also McCall and Kenworthy 
2009) examine associations between norms about inequality and policy attitudes. Here too the 
authors reach conclusions somewhat at odds with each other: Bartels (2008) argues that, “the 
political significance of economic inequality is mostly lost on many Americans. Although they 
may express genuine allegiance to egalitarian values, they are not sufficiently attuned to the 
political debate to see how those values are implicated in major policy choices” such as the Bush 
tax cuts and estate tax repeal. McCall, in contrast, argues that, “rising inequality did appear to 
produce an increase in desire for some kind of government response to reduce income 
differences… dissatisfaction with inequality is almost uniformly associated with significantly 
greater support for all of the equalizing social policies that we examined,” including support for 
progressive taxation, assistance to the poor, and government spending on public education. 
While the interpretations of these two studies vary, the results are potentially reconciliable, given 
that the authors examine opinion about different policies, and as the methodological approaches 
of the two studies differ substantially. The important point for my purposes is that both authors 
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use beliefs about inequality as the key independent variable – an approach that presumes that 
Americans make use of the concept of “inequality” to make sense of the political economy. As I 
will argue, this presumption is a questionable one. 
 
 
American Views of Downwardly Redistributive Welfare State Programs 
  
“Public support for social welfare programs in the United States has never been easy to 
understand.” 
-Feldman and Steenbergen (2001, pg. 658) 
 
 As Feldman and Steenbergen acknowledge, political scientists have yet to provide a 
compelling account of support for downward redistribution in the United States.4 To be sure, 
social scientists have conducted valuable analyses of the determinants of public attitudes about 
economic inequality and government-led downward redistribution (Bartels 2008; Feldman 1983; 
Feldman and Zaller 1992; Gilens 1999; Hacker and Pierson 2005; Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and 
Smith 1986; Lane 1960; McCall and Kenworthy 2009; Page and Jacobs 2009). However, this 
line of research has been more productive at explaining opposition to downwardly redistributive 
policies than the phenomenon of support for such policies. Indeed, thorough analyses of 
nationally representative survey data have found that support for downward redistribution is 
higher than is commonly believed (Cook and Barrett 1992; Gilens 1999; Page and Jacobs 2009). 
However, these findings appear inconsistent with opposing patterns for other policies; Americans 
sometimes appear to support policies that are upwardly distributive, such as the estate tax, the 
home mortgage interest deduction, and the retirement savings deduction (see Bartels 2008; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 However, Feldman and Steenbergen themselves make valuable progress toward this goal, as 
will be discussed later. 
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Mettler 2011). In short, substantial work remains to be done if scholars are to understand both 
the pattern of support for downward redistribution and the exceptions to this pattern. 
  
The Role of Self-Interest 
 Some may not believe that support for downward redistribution requires explanation, 
arguing as follows: the majority of Americans would benefit from taking resources from the rich, 
and therefore should be expected to support government-led downward redistribution (Bartels 
2008; Hochschild 1981). This argument rests on a self-interest premise: that people will support 
policies that materially benefit them and oppose those that do not. However, the extent to which 
self-interest influences public opinion is the subject of continuing debate.5  
 Moreover, the following patterns suggest that the role of self-interest should not be taken 
for granted. Consider opinions about government spending held by those in the top third and the 
bottom third of the income distribution, taken from the American National Election Studies’ 
(ANES) nationally representative survey data from 1992 to 2008. Responses to these questions 
are scaled from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the most extreme position in favor of increasing 
spending, 0 represents the most extreme position in favor of decreasing spending, and 0.5 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A plethora of research findings, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, suggested that in many 
cases self-interest is a weak predictor of public opinion and political behavior across a wide 
variety of domains (Feldman 1982; Fong 2001; Kinder 1986; Kinder and Kiewet 1979, 1981; 
Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mansbridge 1990; Sears et al. 1980). However, methodological 
advances in a couple of recent studies have enabled scholars to detect more self-interest effects 
than had been previously evident (Bergan 2009; Doherty, Gerber, and Green 2006). Since this 
initial wave of research, scholars have broadened the concept of self-interest – to include longer 
time-horizons, for example (Alesina and Ferrara 2005) – or accepted that self-interest sometimes 
does not predict public opinion or political behavior well and begun the search for the conditions 
under which self-interest matters most (Chong et al. 2001; Hunt et al. 2010; Sears and Funk 
1991). 
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represents the position that spending should be kept the same. Mean responses, weighted to 
approximate national representativeness, are presented in Figure 2.1a-d.  
[Insert Figure 2.1a-d about here] 
Aggregate support for increasing federal spending on aid to the poor seems quite high, 
and stable over a sixteen year time period, in the face of claims such as the following: “the 
American poor apparently do not support the downward redistribution of wealth” (Hochschild 
1981, 1). Indeed, even well-off Americans appear to support increased aid to the poor: further 
analyses, which pool across this time period, show that Americans in the top third of the income 
distribution are nearly four times as likely to say that federal spending on aid to the poor should 
be increased (44 percent) as to say it should be decreased (12 percent; the remainder say funding 
levels should not be changed). Restricting the analysis to the top five percent of income earners 
yields similar results: respondents are nearly three times as likely to say aid to the poor should be 
increased (39 percent) as to say it should be decreased (15 percent). Finally, while an income gap 
in support for downward redistribution is evident, suggesting some role for self-interest, this 
effect is quite small. Indeed, as Figure 2.1b shows, even the homeless are generally viewed as 
deserving of increased government aid, again with very little differences across income levels. 
These patterns cannot be written off to a general pattern of support for increased government 
spending, as government aid to groups other than the poor – foreigners (Figure 2.1c) and blacks 
(Figure 2.1d) – is not nearly as popular. 
These findings are consistent with those of Page and Jacobs (2009), whose original, 
nationally representative survey uncovers substantial support for a wide variety of policies that 
would downwardly redistribute wealth even when the respondent would have to pay increased 
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taxes, and even when the respondent is relatively well-off. Yet scholars subscribing to the self-
interest premise rarely address this kind of apparent violation. 
 
The Role of Principles 
 Another potential factor affecting public opinion about downward redistribution is “core 
values” or “principles.” In particular, scholars have long focused on individualism, a concept that 
encompasses a range of principles such as economic self-reliance, laissez-faire capitalism, and a 
limited role for government. Kluegel and Smith (1986, 5) refer to these principles, taken 
together, as the “dominant ideology” – not in the sense of a coherent belief system (Converse 
1964) but rather a widespread belief that “opportunity for economic advancement based on hard 
work is plentiful” and the concomitant judgment that individuals ought to be “personally 
responsible for their own economic fate.” Individualistic principles have a long tradition in 
American political thought (Arieli 1964; Bellah et al. 1985; Hofstader 1948; Huntington 1981; 
Weber 1930) and undergird public opposition to many forms of downward redistribution 
(Feldman and Zaller 1992; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Markus 2001; 
McClosky and Zaller 1984; Shen and Edwards 2005). The prevalence of individualism and its 
strong ties to public opinion deepens the puzzle presented here. If “[a]dherence to the dominant 
ideology” of individualism is so “widespread” (Kluegel and Smith 1986, 289) why, and under 
what conditions, does support for downward redistribution persist? 
 A different principle (or core value), egalitarianism, has more promise to address the 
puzzle of support for downward redistribution. Like individualism, the concept of egalitarianism, 
or support for equality, has a long history in the United States (e.g., de Tocqueville 1835; Lipset 
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1979), and its deceptive appeal can conceal a variety of meanings (Rae et al. 1981). Analyses of 
survey data indicate that at least in some cases, those Americans subscribing to egalitarian ideals 
are more likely to support downward redistribution (Feldman 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996). 
 However, other studies give reason to doubt the ability of an explanation based on 
egalitarianism to account for American support for downward redistribution. Feldman and 
Zaller’s (1992, 285) examination of open-ended responses to “stop-and-think” prompts on the 
ANES finds that “supporters of social welfare are hardly more likely to invoke egalitarian values 
than welfare opponents.” Similarly, Bartels’ (2008, 161) extensive analysis of public opinion 
about economic inequality and public policy argues, “the political significance of economic 
inequality is mostly lost on many Americans. Although they may express genuine allegiance to 
egalitarian values, they are not sufficiently attuned to the political debate to see how those values 
are implicated in major policy choices.”6 
 In response to the limitations of an egalitarianism explanation for public support for 
downward redistribution, one study, conducted by Feldman and Steenbergen (2001, 659) 
identifies another principle that might underpin support for social welfare policies, 
humanitarianism: “the belief that people have responsibilities toward their fellow human beings 
and should come to the assistance of others in need.” Their analysis of survey data indicates that 
humanitarianism predicts support for poverty relief and other forms of aid for those in need but 
does not explain the (less common) belief that government should take a more active role by 
“intervening” in the economy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bartels does find a powerful association between egalitarianism and policy opinion in some 
domains, however. 
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 It seems clear that principles are an important part of the story of American opinion about 
downward redistribution. But if Kinder and Sanders (1996, 159) are correct that the effects of 
principles “have a contingency and specificity about them that are out of keeping with the 
common portrayal of principles as unstoppable forces that level all opposition,” what factors 
account for their “contingency and specificity”? On this point, Wong (2010, 197) persuasively 
argues that the principles of egalitarianism and humanitarianism “often operate corralled by 
community boundaries.” Kinder and Sanders (159) frame the question as follows: “When 
Americans say that they are unhappy that not everyone is given an equal chance, do they really 
have an abstract “everyone” in mind, or just some particular ones? When Americans say that the 
nation would be better off if people were treated more equally, are they thinking of people in 
general, or particular kinds of people?” Wong’s answer, anticipated by Kinder and Sanders, is 
that principles are applied differentially depending on the social group under consideration. For 
example, neighbors are seen as more deserving of humanitarian aid than denizens of distant 
lands: “Contributing help to ease distant suffering, such that little time or money remains to help 
a neighbor, would be strongly sanctioned by most of the most common value systems” (pg. 
xviii).  
 Extrapolating from this logic, it seems reasonable that in order to come to terms with both 
the pattern of support for downward redistribution and the exceptions to this pattern, we need to 
know more about the social groups people believe to be affected by redistributive policies. I 
argue, in short, for a “group-centric” perspective on public opinion about downward 
redistribution (Nelson and Kinder 1996). As will be explained in the next chapter, I believe that a 
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group-centric approach promises to contribute to our understanding of public opinion about 
economic inequality as well. 
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Figure 2.1a. Support for Government Aid to the Poor, by Income, 1992-2008 
 
Figure 2.1b. Support for Government Aid to the Homeless, by Income, 1988-1996 
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Figure 2.1c. Support for Government Increasing Foreign Aid, by Income, 1990-2008 
 
Figure 2.1d. Support for Government Increasing Aid to Blacks, by Income, 1970-2008 
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Chapter Three  
 
Attitudes toward the poor, the rich, and opinion about inequality and redistribution 
 
  
 This chapter begins by developing the theoretical framework regarding how the poor and 
the rich are viewed in the United States – in particular, whether the poor should be viewed more 
or less favorably than the rich. Next I lay out expectations about the consequences of attitudes 
toward the poor and the rich in two domains: policy attitudes and candidate evaluations. 
 
Are the Poor Viewed More or Less Favorably than the Rich? 
 I begin with the hypothesis that the poor are viewed unfavorably relative to the rich. This 
expectation is consistent with sociologists Kluegel and Smith’s (1986) contention that 
individualism is the “dominant ideology” in the United States. That is, if most Americans believe 
that individuals are “personally responsible for their own economic fate,” they should derogate 
the poor for their purported deficiencies and celebrate the rich for their virtues.7 
 Another reason to expect the poor to be viewed unfavorably is racial prejudice: given that 
many whites are prejudiced against blacks (e.g., Feldman and Huddy 2009; Hutchings 2009) and 
given that media coverage has often associated poverty with blackness (e.g., Gilens 1999), we 
might expect that racial prejudice results in negative evaluations of the poor relative to the rich. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Some scholars take a more moderate view, arguing on the basis of studies of convenience 
samples that both the poor and rich are viewed ambivalently (e.g., Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2008; 
Hochschild 1981). Kluegel and Smith themselves argue that forces such as self-interest curtail 
the dominant ideology of individualism, albeit weakly. 
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 Leading theories in social psychology might also lead us to expect that the poor are 
viewed negatively relative to the rich. According to social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 
1999), for example, high-status groups maintain their position in the social hierarchy through 
“legitimizing myths,” widely shared cultural ideologies extolling high-status groups (such as the 
rich) and denigrating low-status groups (such as the poor). Relatedly, both just world theory 
(Lerner 1981) and system justification theory (Jost, Banaji and Nosek 2004) argue that 
individuals possess a psychological motivation to view existing social arrangements as just, 
leading them to view high-status groups as worthy of their privilege and low-status groups as 
deserving of their inferior position.  
 One hypothesis, then, is that together, these forces – individualism, racial prejudice, 
legitimizing myths, and the motivation to believe in a just world – produce negative views of the 
poor and positive views of the rich. Scholarly titles such as The War Against the Poor (Gans 
1995), The Undeserving Poor (Katz 1989), and Pity the Billionaire (Frank 2012) are consistent 
with this contention. Media accounts often share a similar outlook: The Economist8 (2006) 
claims that “Americans want to join the rich, not soak them,” and a recent New York Times 
(2011) article9 writes of a “New Resentment of the Poor.”  
 However, there are also reasons to doubt the hypothesis that the poor are viewed less 
favorably than the rich. First, the argument that individualism dominates political thinking in the 
United States may go too far. As noted above, Kinder and Sanders (1996, 159) argue that the 
effects of principles such as individualism “have a contingency and specificity about them that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 From “The Rich, the Poor, and the Growing Gap Between Them,” June 17, 2006. 
9 August 30, 2011. Last accessed at:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/the-new-resentment-of-the-poor.html?_r=0 
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are out of keeping with the common portrayal of principles as unstoppable forces that level all 
opposition.” For example, research has shown that racially prejudiced whites may hold blacks to 
a higher standard of individualism than they would hold members of their own group, expecting 
blacks – but not whites – to work hard to get ahead rather than receiving government aid (e.g., 
Sears and Henry 2003). Whether a given class group is held to a high standard of individualism, 
then, may depend on whether the class group is viewed positively. 
 Furthermore, the contention that racial prejudice leads to negative attitudes toward the 
poor may also be overstated, due to a common misreading of Gilens’ (1999) landmark book, 
Why Americans Hate Welfare. As an example, consider sociologists Newman and Jacobs’ (2010) 
interpretation of Gilens’ findings: “Gilens finds that as the image of the poor got blacker, 
willingness to support expenditures for the poor fell through the floorboards.” To the contrary: 
Gilens finds high levels of public support for a wide variety government measures to aid the 
poor, including Supplemental Security Income, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Head Start. 
He also finds that support for aid to the poor extends beyond particular policy programs to 
general propositions. To be sure, Gilens concludes that racial prejudice underpins negative 
evaluations of a particular subgroup of the poor: welfare recipients. But this does not imply that 
the poor writ large are viewed negatively.  
 Finally, while political scientists have been quick to draw on strands of research in social 
psychology that explains why individuals might derogate low-status groups and extol high-status 
groups, other research in social psychology has been often ignored. In particular, political 
scientists have made comparatively few attempts to incorporate research in social psychology 
that is suggestive of the power of sympathy for low-status groups (n.b., Conover 1988) and 
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resentment of high-status groups. Here I rely on such research to develop a competing 
expectation, examining the possibility that the poor are viewed with sympathy while the rich are 
viewed with resentment. 
 
 
Sympathy for the Poor 
Sympathy, often referred to as “empathic concern” in social psychology,10 is defined as 
the belief that some person or group has suffered “undeserved misfortune” coupled with the 
feeling that this is a bad thing (Nussbaum 2001).11 Sympathy for others is a widespread 
phenomenon that motivates a wide variety of helping behaviors (e.g., Batson 1991, 2011; 
Hoffman 1984, 1987; Toi and Batson 1982; Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomisello 2009).  
Some research suggests that sympathy for low-status social groups can be a politically 
consequential phenomenon, motivating individuals to support policies intended to aid such 
groups (Conover 1988). Consider Feldman and Zaller’s (1992) analysis of the justifications that 
supporters of social welfare policies gave for their position in open-ended responses on the 
ANES. Social welfare policy supporters did not appear to rely on the core value of 
egalitarianism; they were “hardly more likely to invoke egalitarian values than welfare 
opponents” (pg. 285). But they did often provide an “indication that certain people need 
assistance” (pg. 282), suggesting that many welfare policy supporters may view the poor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “Empathic concern” is defined as an “affective outcome” consisting of “feelings of sympathy 
and compassion for unfortunate others” (Davis 1994, pgs. 17-19, 57). Some definitions of 
“empathy” are also consistent with this perspective (e.g., Hoffman 1984, 1987). 
11 Nussbaum often uses the term “compassion,” but argues that the difference between the two is 
minimal. 
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sympathetically – in need and deserving of government aid. A depiction of sympathy for the 
poor can be seen in the political cartoon in Figure 3.1a. 
[Insert Figure 3.1 about here] 
Resentment of the Rich 
 As Feather and Sherman (2002, pg. 954) write, “central to resentment is a feeling of 
injustice”: a feeling of hostility based on the judgment that some person or group enjoys 
advantage that is undeserved (see also Ben-Ze-ev 2000; Parrott 1991; Rawls 1971; Smith et al. 
1996).12 Resentment, and concomitantly the desire to “pull down” members of a successful 
outgroup, is a common phenomenon (Feather and Nairn 2005; Leach and Spears 2008); When 
high-status outgroups suffer misfortune, schadenfreude, pleasure resulting from the misfortune 
of others, often occurs (Cikara and Fiske 2012; Feather and Sherman 2002). 
 Consider the recent “Millionaires’ March” in New York, an example of the influence of 
resentment of the rich on public opinion and political behavior. Several hundred people, 
protesting the expiration of a state tax on those making over $250,000 per year, marched to the 
homes of several wealthy individuals in New York City, chanting “hey mister millionaire, time 
to pay your fair share!”13 One protestor was quoted as saying, "I'm out here because we're tired 
of a tiny number of Americans stealing off of us and not giving us our due." To be sure, this 
example comes from a time period during which resentment of the rich may have been especially 
high, in the midst of the Occupy Wall Street movement. Yet Bartels’ (2008) analysis of feeling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Some social psychologists restrict resentment to public, sanctioned feelings that another 
person or group has undeserved advantage, referring to privately held feelings of this kind as 
“hostile envy” (e.g., Smith et al. 1996). 
13 From “Protestors Target NY’s Richest in Millionaires March,” Andrew Siff, October 13, 2011.  
http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Millionaires-March-1-Percent-99-Percent-Occupy-
Wall-Street-131528853.html 
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thermometer scores in the American National Election Studies show that even in 2004, when the 
economy was performing well, a nationally representative sample of Americans rated the rich 
unfavorably in comparison to many social groups, including the poor, who were rated relatively 
favorably. A depiction of resentment of the rich can be found in the political cartoon presented in 
Figure 3.1b. In sum, I hypothesize that the poor are viewed more favorably than the rich: the 
poor with sympathy, and the rich with resentment.  
 Of course, it is also possible that the poor and the rich are viewed equally favorably, or, 
perhaps more plausibly, equally unfavorably. After all, for the vast majority of Americans, who 
consider themselves to be either middle class or working class, the poor and the rich are both 
outgroups. Given that theories of ethnocentrism postulate that humans are predisposed to 
evaluate ingroups favorably and outgroups unfavorably (Kinder and Kam 2009), it is possible 
that both the poor and the rich are viewed negatively. Finally, it could be that Americans simply 
do not think about the poor and the rich enough to possess meaningful attitudes about them. We 
shall see. 
 
The Conditional Influence of Class Attitudes on Policy Opinion 
“Scores of studies show that public opinion on matters of policy is group-centric: that is, shaped 
in powerful ways by the attitudes citizens harbor toward the social groups they see as the 
principal beneficiaries or victims of the policy.” 
  -Kinder and Dale-Riddle (2012) 
  
 Social groups are critical to the way humans make sense out of everyday experience, 
according to predominant theories of human psychology and behavior, including social identity 
theory (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1979), social dominance 
(Sidanius and Pratto 1999), system justification theory (Jost and Banaji 1994; Jost, Banaji, and 
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Nosek 2004), ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2009; Sumner 1906), and reference group theory 
(Hyman 1960; Hyman 1968; Merton 1968), It should not be surprising, therefore, that political 
scientists have found that evaluations of social groups influence public opinion across a wide 
variety of domains (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Nelson and Kinder 1996).  
Attitudes about social groups are so important to public opinion in part because they 
provide an efficient means to sort through a complicated information environment to reach a 
decision. The masses’ level of knowledge about political affairs is low relative to political elites 
(Converse 1975; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lippman 1902). Furthermore, given demands on 
the public’s time and the fact that the public is largely non-ideological (Converse 1964; Kinder 
and Kalmoe 2010), even if levels of information were high it would take a long time to sort 
through that information to reach a considered judgment. As a result, individuals tend to satisfice 
(Simon 1979, 1985). That is, constraints on information and time cause individuals to rely on 
time-saving decision strategies – heuristics – and group evaluations are an especially reliable and 
efficient heuristic (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). 
Rather than putting in the time to obtain information, sort through it, and apply abstract 
ideological principles to reach a decision, one can reach an opinion more efficiently by thinking 
about which social group might constitute the “principal beneficiaries or victims” of a proposed 
policy and figuring out whether one likes that social group. From there the decision about 
whether to support the policy is relatively simple. 
Indeed, attitudes about social groups are strongly linked to opinions about policies that 
would affect these groups. For example, negative stereotypes about Blacks are associated with 
opinion about miscegenation laws, housing integration policies, and punitive criminal justice 
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policies (Feldman et al. 2009; Kinder and McConnaughy 2006; Hurwitz and Peffley 2005). 
Similarly, support for civil liberties of a wide variety of social groups is powerfully influenced 
by evaluations of the groups under consideration (Chong 1993; Kuklinski et al. 1991; Sullivan, 
Piereson, and Marcus 1982). In short, a plethora of research findings demonstrate the “group-
centric” nature of public opinion (Nelson and Kinder 1996; see also Sniderman, Brody, and 
Tetlock 1991). 
Yet for the most part research about the determinants of public opinion about policies 
related to downward economic redistribution ignores the possibility that group evaluations are 
influential. To some extent scholars have examined the effect of attitudes about the poor; 
however, the interpretation attached to such findings emphasizes other factors such as racial 
attitudes (e.g., Gilens 1999) or individualism (Feldman 1983; Feldman and Zaller 1992). 
Attitudes about the rich have been examined by a few studies in psychology (Cuddy, Fiske and 
Glick 2008; Fiske et al. 2002), political science (Bartels 2008) and sociology (McCall 2007), but 
the political consequences of these attitudes have not been analyzed. The present research is in 
line with a long tradition of scholarship on group-centrism. Specifically, I argue that attitudes 
about social class groups underlie public support for economic redistribution – at least under 
certain conditions.  
An alternative possibility is that class might be a social rather than a political distinction. 
That is, given that “politics is a sideshow in the great circus of life” (Dahl 1961) and that citizens 
generally “morselize” (Lane 1962), leaving thoughts about politics disconnected from each other 
and from their private lives (see also Hochschild 1981), it is possible that class is sometimes 
salient in social life but rarely, if ever, in political life. Indeed, to take a group-centric perspective 
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on public opinion is not to argue that attitudes about all social groups are brought to bear on 
policy opinions all the time. Rather, social groups must be linked to specific policies in the 
public mind for views about these groups to influence public opinion (Nelson and Kinder 1996). 
As Converse’s (1964) seminal article on group-centrism argues, in those situations in which “the 
link is not made explicit by the very nature of the situation…the individual must be endowed 
with some cognitions of the group as an entity and with some interstitial ‘linking’ information 
indicating why a given party or policy is relevant to the group.”  
 The question becomes whether a given redistributive policy is seen as such by the public; 
whether, that is, it is perceived to benefit the rich or the poor. In such cases, the class group 
attitudes of sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich will be brought to bear on public 
opinion about the policy. In contrast, in cases in which it is unclear who reaps a benefit of a 
given policy or who pays a cost, class group attitudes will be irrelevant to views of the policy. In 
short, I argue that the relationship between class group attitudes and policy opinion is conditional 
on whether it is clear how the poor and the rich are affected by the policy.  
 It follows from this discussion that providing information indicating that the primary 
beneficiaries of a given policy are the poor should make the policy more popular, as the poor are 
generally viewed sympathetically, while providing information indicating that the primary 
beneficiaries of a policy are the rich should make it less popular, on average, due to the fact that 
the rich are generally viewed resentfully. 
 
Attitudes toward the Poor and the Rich Shape Candidate Evaluations 
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 I argue that attitudes toward the poor and rich shape reactions to political entities, 
including candidates for public office. After all, research about the impact of social groups on 
public opinion and political behavior suggests that social groups become relevant to politics 
when they are “sites of persistent inequality” (Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2011). Given limited 
economic mobility in the United States (Bowles, Gintis and Groves 2005), class clearly qualifies 
as a site of “persistent inequality.” 
 Attitudes toward the poor and the rich influence candidate evaluations as follows. Kinder 
and Dale-Riddle’s theory of attitudes toward social groups as “short-term forces” in elections 
holds that when “candidates are seen as standing for or against certain social groups, voters will 
be attracted or driven away, depending on their attitude toward the groups in question.” 
Accordingly, the key consideration may be the extent to which it is clear that a candidate for 
public office benefits (or victimizes) a class group.  
 To the extent, then, that Democrats are viewed to more likely than Republicans to help 
the poor (Petrocik 1996), reactions to Democratic candidates may be in part a function of 
whether one likes or dislikes the poor. Similarly, to the extent that the actions of the Republican 
Party are perceived to benefit the rich,14 meanwhile, reactions to Republican candidates may be 
in part a function of whether one likes or dislikes the rich. It may be, in sum, that attitudes about 
class groups influence voter reactions to candidates. Indeed, if political entities (parties, social 
movements) on the left are associated with the poor while political entities on the right are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, for example, a Bloomberg News Poll finding that 60% of Americans report that 
“Republicans have put too much emphasis on protecting the wealthy.” 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-13/republicans-deemed-too-pro-rich-57-in-poll-want-
change.html 
 29	  
associated with the rich, these patterns may extend beyond candidates to political entities more 
generally. 
 This chapter has set out competing theoretical expectations about the direction of 
attitudes toward the poor and the rich: while earlier work supports the expectation that the poor 
are viewed less favorably than the rich, I have drawn on largely-overlooked research in social 
psychology to develop the expectation that the poor are actually viewed more favorably than the 
rich. Finally, I have argued that attitudes toward the poor and the rich are likely to influence 
attitudes toward both public policy and candidates for public office – but only when it is clear 
whether a given policy or candidate is likely to help or hurt the poor or the rich. 
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Figure 3.1 Media Depictions of the Poor and the Rich 
 
3.1a. Sympathetic Depiction of the Poor 
 
 
3.1b. Resentful Depiction of the Rich 
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Chapter Four  
 
How Do Americans View the Poor and the Rich? 
  
 This chapter examines the nature of American attitudes toward the poor and the rich in 
the United States. It begins with an exercise in face validity: if I am correct that evaluations of 
these class groups figure into political preferences, it may be that open-ended evaluations of the 
major political parties include mentions of the poor and rich. After examining this possibility, I 
briefly attempt to get a sense of what the admittedly ambiguous terms “poor” and “rich” mean to 
people. Next, moving to the heart of the empirical analyses in this chapter, I examine the 
distribution of responses to original survey questions capturing attitudes toward the poor and the 
rich in the United States. Finally, these questions are used to construct indices of sympathy 
toward the poor and resentment of the rich; the chapter concludes by examining the properties of 
these measures. As will be seen, it appears that Americans have meaningful, stable, and reliable 
attitudes toward the poor and the rich. Furthermore, contrary to common accounts that 
Americans are approving of economic inequality, the poor are generally viewed sympathetically, 
and the rich with resentment.  
 
Taking Americans at their Word  
 The gap between the richest and the rest in the United States has been growing for 
decades, and recent research examines American reactions to what scholars define as inequality 
and American attitudes about government-led downward redistribution (e.g., Bartels 2008; 
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McCall 2013; Page and Jacobs 2009). But do Americans even use the terms “inequality” and 
“redistribution” to make sense of our changing political economy? Or do they think of the polity 
in different class terms entirely? 
 I hypothesize that political thinking in a period of economic inequality includes attitudes 
toward class groups: in this section, I focus on groups at the two extremes of the economic 
distribution – the poor and the rich. This hypothesis is based on a vibrant tradition of research, 
largely inspired by Converse’s (1964) seminal research, demonstrating that public opinion and 
political behavior is dominated by attitudes toward social groups (e.g., Nelson and Kinder 1996).  
 As discussed above, existing survey research typically asks respondents closed-ended 
questions about “inequality” and “redistribution” – here, I take respondents at their word, 
examining whether these terms are used as often as terms about which we less often ask 
Americans: the poor and the rich. I conduct a content analysis (with the assistance of a team of 
undergraduate students15) of responses to open-ended questions in the 2008 American National 
Election Studies time series survey. The questions examined ask respondents what, if anything, 
they like – and subsequently what, if anything, they dislike – about each of the two major parties. 
The benefit of this approach is that it meets individuals on their own terms, examining the 
language they use rather than prescribing options to them in a closed-ended survey. Moreover, 
for purposes of comparison, I also examine mentions of social groups related to white/black 
racial terms, since racial attitudes represent an important cleavage in American public opinion 
(Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996)." Response rates to the questions can 
be found in Appendix 4.1; the full list of terms used in the content analysis is in Appendix 4.2. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Four undergraduate students blind to the hypotheses of the study independently coded all of 
the responses and then met to resolve discrepancies.  
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 The results, presented in Figure 4.1, reveal that while terms related to “inequality” and 
“redistribution” are not often mentioned, terms related to two class groups frequently appear, 
those at the extremes of the economic distribution: “the poor” and “the rich.” Indeed, these class 
terms are more frequently used than racial terms, although that may be in part due to social 
taboos regarding talking about race. Finally, it appears that class considerations figure 
prominently in what respondents dislike about Republicans and what they do like about 
Democrats. This finding will be revisited later in the manuscript. 
[Insert Figure 4.1 about here] 
 On the basis of these findings, I argue that to understand public opinion about economic 
inequality – as it exists in the minds of ordinary Americans, that is, rather than elites – we must 
come to terms with American views of class groups. In particular, what do Americans think 
about the two class groups at the extremes of the distribution: the poor and the rich? First, 
however, I take a brief detour in order to get a sense of what survey respondents intend these 
terms – the “poor” and the “rich” – to mean. 
 
Who Counts as Poor? As Rich? 
 Terms referring to social groups, at least as they are referred to in everyday conversation, 
are not clearly bounded categories. While the analyst might construct social group terms by 
specifying a bright line between the poor and the middle class – for example, the official federal 
poverty line – the point of this part of the project is not to impose categories on the thinking of 
ordinary Americans but rather to examine the categories that individuals already use. Indeed, it 
would be silly to ask the following survey question: “How often do you feel sympathy for those 
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below the official poverty line set by the federal government?” This question would assume an 
attitude that respondents are unlikely to possess. Yet it is clear from the open-ended analyses 
above that respondents do have attitudes toward groups related to the “poor” and “rich,” and it is 
these that I seek to examine. While these terms are admittedly ambiguous – indeed, they may 
derive power because of, not in spite of, their ambiguity – it is possible that they encompass a 
range of shared meaning. It is this range I (briefly) examine in this section. 
 I do so using a survey on Mechanical Turk (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012), with 502 
adult U.S. citizen respondents, conducted in January 2014. First respondents are asked, “Suppose 
there is a person about whom you know ONLY ONE THING: the amount of money per year this 
person makes. How MUCH money would this person have to earn per year for you to conclude 
that the person is definitely POOR?” Respondents are next asked the same question except the 
word “poor” is replaced with “rich.” This question elicited a range of responses, perhaps because 
– as some respondents pointed out in an open-ended section at the end of the survey – income is 
insufficient in the absence of information about wealth. Still, the median response for the “poor” 
question was $15,000, while the median response for the “rich” question was $200,000. 
Moreover, the 5th-95th percentile ranges were non-overlapping: for the poor, the range was from 
$50,000 to $1 million, while for the poor, the range was from $1000 to $35,670. This suggests 
that while respondents may not have had the exact same bright lines for the poor/rich categories, 
there was little overlap: if one respondent viewed a person as poor, no other respondent was 
likely to view that person as rich.  
 Similar results were obtained for an additional question: “Now suppose there is a 
different person about whom you know ONLY ONE THING: the amount of money this person 
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HAS IN THE BANK. How MUCH money would this person have to HAVE IN THE BANK for 
you to conclude that the person is definitely POOR?” Again, an additional question was asked 
with the term “RICH” replacing poor, and the purpose of these questions was to move beyond 
income, to begin to get at the possibility that perceptions of wealth also influence perceptions of 
who counts as poor or rich. Here too, however, as some respondents pointed out, the utility of the 
question is limited, as it is possible to be rich without having any money in the bank (e.g., all the 
money could be in stocks). Still, the medians for poor ($100) and rich ($250,000) were far apart. 
And the 5th-95th percentile ranges were once again non-overlapping: $10,000 to $5 million for 
the rich, and $100 to $7,066 for the poor. 
 It may also prove instructive to examine the perceived racial composition of the “poor” – 
in particular, if I find that many Americans view the poor positively, it is possible that this term 
“poor” is used to refer not to all those at the bottom of the economic distribution but a particular 
subgroup of the poor: perhaps the white poor, for example, who may be viewed to be more 
deserving than the black poor. The final questions on the survey, therefore, ask: “Approximately 
what percentage of POOR people do you think are WHITE/BLACK?” Consistent with research 
showing that media depictions of poverty have overrepresented blacks, I find that the mean 
percentage of poor people perceived to be black was 52, while the mean percentage of poor 
people perceived to be white was 41. 
 In sum, while respondents to this Mechanical Turk survey do not appear to agree exactly 
on who counts as poor and rich, and while these preliminary survey questions ought to be refined 
in future research, it does appear that the terms “poor” and “rich” encompass a range of shared 
meaning. In particular, it is rare that one person’s “poor” is another person’s “rich”; moreover, 
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the poor are disproportionately viewed to be black.  Now that we have a sense that the terms 
“poor” and “rich” are used by individuals in reference to the two major political parties, and now 
that we have at least a crude sense of what individuals mean by these terms, in the next section I 
examine American attitudes toward these groups at the two extremes of the economic 
distribution. 
American Attitudes toward the Poor and the Rich 
 High-quality measures of attitudes toward the poor and the rich do not exist in available 
data, as political scientists have not systematically engaged the possibility that these attitudes are 
consequential. The American National Election Studies includes feeling thermometer scores 
about these class groups; these measures are adequate but not ideal. The main problem with these 
measures is the potential for interpersonal incomparability (Brady 1988) and, relatedly, 
systematic error resulting from unlabeled interior response options (Pasek and Krosnick 2010).  
 Accordingly, in this section I present the results of development and validation of survey 
measures of attitudes toward the poor and the rich. I began with a pilot study in April 2012, in 
which an adult sample (n = 135) was recruited through Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk 
platform (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012). Subjects responded to a variety of open-ended 
questions about class and politics in the United States. I studied the responses to determine the 
vernacular through which attitudes toward the rich and poor are expressed in order to develop 
question batteries. Following Conover’s (1988) “cognitive-affective model of the role of social 
groups in political thinking,” I developed questions about deservingness – whether the poor and 
the rich have more or less money than they deserve – and questions reflecting emotions 
expressed toward these class groups, including sympathy, compassion, anger, and resentment. 
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The questions are listed in Figure 4.2, and the performance of these questions was examined 
through two separate studies, each of which is described below. 
 Two original survey datasets are analyzed: a study conducted through Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk platform (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012) in the summer of 2012 and a survey 
conducted by YouGov-Polimetrix in early 2013. The Mechanical Turk study is a two-wave panel 
study of a convenience sample of 1,387 adults16: wave 1 was conducted in June 2012; wave 2 
was conducted in August 2012. The YouGov-Polimetrix study was conducted on a national 
sample of 800 adults from Feb. 8-14, 2013. The benefit of the Mechanical Turk study is that the 
lower cost in obtaining respondents allows for a panel design, allowing me to assess the stability 
of attitudes toward the poor and the rich. The YouGov-Polimetrix study, meanwhile, has a more 
diverse sample, including weights that allow the analyses to approximate national 
representativeness.17 These datasets are supplemented with the American National Election time 
series surveys in order to assess class group attitudes and their effects over time. 
[Insert Figure 4.2 about here] 
 Conover (1988) writes that political thinking about social groups is dominated by “the 
desire to know who is getting what and whether they deserve it.” If the logic of individualism 
dominates public thinking – if, that is, Kluegel and Smith (1986) are correct that individuals are 
held “personally responsible” for their “economic fate,” we should expect that both the poor and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Attrition is substantial, as is common with Mechanical Turk panel studies: only 537 completed 
both waves. 
17 YouGov-Polimetrix used a matching algorithm with respect to gender, age, race, education, 
party identification, ideology, and political interest to produce an internet sample that closely 
approximates the demographic makeup of known marginals for the general population of the 
United States from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2008 American Community Survey. Scholars 
differ with respect to whether this approach of applying weights to opt-in samples yields 
“nationally representative” datasets (Baker et al. 2010; Rivers 2006; Vavreck and Rivers 2008) 
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the rich will be perceived to have about what they deserve: no more, no less. Or, if Americans 
agree with the Wall Street Journal’s18 description of the poor as “lucky duckies” (since they pay 
no federal income tax), and if they view the rich as “job creators” unfairly penalized by 
government by progressive taxation, they should actually expect the poor to have more than they 
deserve and the rich to have less.  
 But as Figure 4.3 shows, the majority of respondents in the YouGov-Polimetrix (analyses 
weighted to approximate national representativeness) say the rich have more money than they 
deserve (58%) while very few say the rich have less than they deserve (4%; the remainder say 
they have about the right amount). In contrast, respondents are much less likely to say the poor 
have more money than they deserve (8%) than to say they have less than they deserve (59%; the 
remainder say they have the right amount). 
 Figure 4.3 also shows the distribution of affective tags applied to these class groups. 
When interpreting these results, it is important to remember that negative attitudes toward an 
outgroup are often not expressed through unfavorable evaluations but rather through the denial 
of favorable evaluations (Meertens and Pettigrew 1997). It is not surprising, therefore, that 
subjects report feeling sympathy more often on average than resentment. Bearing this in mind, 
the comparisons between attitudes toward the poor and attitudes toward the rich are instructive. 
Almost four times as many subjects express sympathy toward the poor (79%) as toward the rich 
(21%), while about twice as many subjects express resentment toward the rich (29%) as toward 
the poor (15%). Additional emotions questions (compassion, anger) show similar distributions, 
and these patterns are even more pronounced in the Mechanical Turk survey (not shown). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 From “The Non-Taxpaying Class: Those lucky duckies!” November 20, 2002. 
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[Insert Figure 4.3 about here] 
 Finally, I examine whether these findings extend beyond the current historical moment, 
which follows one of the biggest recessions in American history as well as the Occupy Wall 
Street movement. Making use of American National Election Time Series cross-sectional 
surveys dating back to 1993 (the earliest year containing a thermometer score for the rich), I 
compare feeling thermometer scores toward the poor and the rich in Figure 4.4.  
[Insert Figure 4.4 about here] 
 While there is some evidence that the rich are viewed slightly more negatively in 2012 
than in previous years, more important for my purposes is that the poor are viewed more 
favorably than the rich across the period of examination, even during the period of welfare 
reform in the early- to mid-1990s. It is also important to note that while at first it might seem that 
the rich are still viewed somewhat favorably – above the midpoint of “50” in all years – this 
appears to reflect a general tendency for respondents to resist reporting cold feelings toward 
groups. As Bartels (2008) has noted, placing these attitudes in context with attitudes toward other 
groups reveals that the poor are rated relatively high, on par with other popular groups such as 
Christians and the military, while the rich are rated relatively low, in company with other 
unpopular groups such as feminists and Hindus (see also Bartels 2008). 
 
Measuring Sympathy for the Poor and Resentment of the Rich: Constructing Indices 
 It is important to be sure that the measures reliably capture attitudes toward the poor and 
the rich rather than fleeting responses of the moment in the artificial context of a survey 
interview. To do so, I combine the questions about deservingness and affective tags (weighted 
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equally) into two separate indices, one measuring sympathy for the poor and another measuring 
resentment of the rich; the indices differ slightly across the two surveys, as the lower cost of the 
Mechanical Turk sample allowed for the incorporation of more questions (Figure 4.2). I might 
have constructed the indices somewhat differently, including the exact same questions for both 
attitudes toward the poor and attitudes toward the rich in order to obtain balance. I do not do so 
because the distributions indicate that the dominant perspective of the poor is one of sympathy, 
while the dominant perspective of the rich is one of resentment, and I construct the indices to 
reflect this finding. But it is important to note that the following results do not change if the 
alternative, more balanced approach is adopted. Frequency distributions of the indices can be 
found in Figure 4.5.  
[Insert Figure 4.5 about here] 
 The indices hang together well: the Cronbach’s alpha for the index of sympathy for the 
poor ranges from 0.74 (YouGov-Polimetrix) to 0.78 (Mechanical Turk), while the Cronbach’s 
alpha for the index of resentment of the rich ranges from 0.79 (YouGov-Polimetrix) to 0.83 
(Mechanical Turk). Moreover, responses to the class group attitude questions are stable over 
time. The panel study conducted through Mechanical Turk reveals that for the sympathy for the 
poor index, the wave 1-wave 2 correlation19 is 0.73, and the correlation for the resentment of the 
rich index is 0.69. By comparison, the correlation for a standard ANES index of questions 
measuring an aspect of individualism, the value of limited government (Markus 2001) is 0.73.   
 These results place us in a position to reassess the conventional wisdom about American 
beliefs about our age of economic inequality. McCall (2013) summarizes this account (without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Pearson’s correlation coefficient: the time in between the waves varied from 6-12 weeks. 
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endorsement) as follows: “The rich reap the rewards they deserve for being smart, working hard, 
and producing prosperity for the rest of us. Meanwhile, the poor get what they deserve for not 
availing themselves of the opportunities America lavishes…” The findings challenge this 
common description of American political thought. The modal belief is to view the poor to have 
less than they deserve, and the rich to have less; moreover, this pattern appears to extend beyond 
the current historical moment. Finally, these attitudes can be measured reliably, and they are 
stable over time.  
 Of course, these analyses do not by themselves establish whether class group attitudes 
have political consequences. That is, it is possible that even though Americans have meaningful 
attitudes toward the poor and the rich, when they enter the political arena these class group 
attitudes are crowded out by other considerations. In order to assess this possibility, the next 
chapter examines whether class group attitudes affects policy opinion, while the subsequent 
chapter examines whether class group attitudes affect voter reactions to candidates for public 
office.  
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Table 4.1. Predictors of Attitudes toward the Poor, the Rich 
 
               Sympathy for the Poor                     Resentment of the Rich 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ordinary least squares regression coefficients. All variables 
coded 0 to 1. YouGov-Polimetrix Study. All variables coded 0-1. 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Party ID (Rep.) -0.15*** (0.03) -0.13*** (0.03) 
Ideology (Cons.) -0.09** (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) 
Black Stereotypes -0.22*** (0.07) -0.06 (0.07) 
Age 0.03 (0.04) -0.15*** (0.03) 
Female 0.04** (0.02) -0.02 (0.01) 
South 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
Education 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Poor 0.10*** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 
Constant 0.84*** (0.05) 0.44*** (0.04) 
N 781  760  
R-squared 0.19  0.12  
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Figure 4.1. Open-ended Responses to Party Like, Dislike Questions 
 
 
Y-axis values are percentages. From the 2008 American National Election Studies Time Series 
survey (unweighted). Only those who responded to the question are included in the graph (see 
Appendix 4.1 for response rates). Full list of the terminology that is counted as “class,” “race,” 
“redistribution,” or “equality” mentions is included in Appendix 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. Question wording of sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich 
 
 
4.2a. YouGov-Polimetrix Study 
 
For each of the following groups, please say whether most people in the group have more money 
than they deserve, less money than they deserve, or about the right amount of money. 
 
POOR PEOPLE 
RICH PEOPLE 
 
__A LOT MORE money than they deserve 
__SOMEWHAT MORE money than they deserve 
__SLIGHTLY MORE money than they deserve 
__About the right amount of money 
__SLIGHTLY LESS money than they deserve 
__SOMEWHAT LESS money than they deserve 
__A LOT LESS money than they deserve 
 
 
 
How often have you felt each of the following toward POOR PEOPLE? 
Compassion 
Sympathy 
[Anger and resentment were also asked for comparative purposes] 
  
 
How often have you felt each of the following toward RICH PEOPLE? 
Anger 
Resentment 
[Compassion and sympathy were also asked for comparative purposes] 
 
[Response options: Always, Most of the time, About half the time, Once in a while, Never] 
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4.2b. Mechanical Turk study 
 
Resentment of the Rich 
In the United States, how often are the rich unfairly punished for their success? 
[Often, Sometimes, Rarely, Never] 
 
Which of the following comes closest to your opinion?  
Most rich people: 
-Get A LOT/SOME/ONLY A FEW/NO special breaks from government 
 
Would you say that most rich people have more money than they deserve, or less money than they 
deserve? 
-A LOT MORE/A LITTLE MORE/About the right amount of money/A LITTLE LESS/A LOT 
LESS than they deserve 
 
Do you think that THE RICH have too much influence in American life and politics, not enough 
influence, or about the right amount of influence? 
[If too much:] Would you say that THE RICH have a great deal too much influence in American 
life and politics, moderately too much, or slightly too much? 
[If too little:] Would you say that THE RICH have a great deal too little influence in American life 
and politics, moderately too little, or slightly too little? 
 
How do you feel when you read or hear about RICH people? 
(1-7 scale; 1 = Not at all; 7 = Very strongly) 
Anger; Disgust; Contempt 
 
 
Sympathy for the Poor 
In the United States, how often do people unfairly look down on the poor?  
[Often, Sometimes, Rarely, Never] 
 
Which of the following statements comes closest to your opinion?  
Most poor people:  
-Get A LOT/SOME/ONLY A FEW/NO special breaks from government 
 
Would you say that most poor people have more money than they deserve, or less money than they 
deserve? 
-A LOT MORE/A LITTLE MORE/About the right amount of money/A LITTLE LESS/A LOT 
LESS than they deserve 
 
Do you think that THE POOR have too much influence in American life and politics, not enough 
influence, or about the right amount of influence? 
[If too much:] Would you say that THE POOR have a great deal too much influence in American 
life and politics, moderately too much, or slightly too much? 
[If too little:] Would you say that THE POOR have a great deal too little influence in American life 
and politics, moderately too little, or slightly too little? 
 
How do you feel when you read or hear about POOR people? 
(1-7 scale; 1 = Not at all; 7 = Very strongly) 
-Compassion; Sympathy 
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of Attitudes toward the Rich and Poor 
YouGov-Polimetrix Study (weighted); Y-axis values are percentages; N = 800; 
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4.3c. Compassion - Poor 
 
 
 
4.3d. Compassion - Rich 
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4.3e. Sympathy - Poor 
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4.3g. Anger - Poor 
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4.3i. Resentment - Poor
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Figure 4.4. Affect toward the Rich and Poor Over Time 
 
 
Source: American National Election Time Series Surveys. Bars represent average feeling 
thermometer scores (0-100; high scores indicate greater warmth) for all respondents in a given 
year; analyses are weighted to approximate national representativeness. Missing bars indicate 
that feeling thermometer questions about the group were not asked in that year. Also, 
terminology varies somewhat across years for the rich: in 1993 and 1994, the term “wealthy” is 
used, while in the other years, the term “rich” is used. 
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Figure 4.5. Distribution of Indices 
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Appendix 4.1. Percent Responding to Open-Ended Party Like, Dislike Questions 
 
From the 2008 American National Election Studies Time Series survey (unweighted). Y-axis 
values are percentages. 
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Appendix 4.2. Coding terminology for class, race, redistribution, inequality mentions 
 
Poor terms 
Poor 
Have-nots 
Little people 
Poverty 
Lower class 
Underclass 
Low income (or lower income) 
Welfare 
Needy 
 
Rich terms 
Rich 
The wealthy (or “wealth”) 
Haves 
Upper class 
High income (or “higher” or “upper” income) 
Millionaires/gazillionaires 
Big money 
 
(White/black) Race terms 
Racism 
White 
Diversity  
Multiracial 
African American 
Black 
Minority 
 
Redistribution terms 
Distribute 
Redistribute 
Redistributive 
Redistribution, downward redistribution, upward redistribution 
 
Inequality terms 
Equal 
Unequal 
Equality 
Inequality 
Equivalent 
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Chapter Five 
 
Why Americans Love Welfare State Programs 
 
 For decades, scholars have debated the extent to which Americans support government-
led economic distribution. In this chapter, I take a new perspective on this debate; I draw on the 
concepts of sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich to explain both the broad pattern of 
support for downwardly redistributive policies and the notable exceptions to this pattern. I do so 
as follows: in general, the rich are resented while the poor are viewed sympathetically. When it is 
clear whether the rich or the poor either reap benefits or pay costs as a result of a given policy, 
resentment of the rich and sympathy for the poor profoundly influence public opinion, driving 
support for downward redistribution. However, for some policies – particularly upwardly 
redistributive policies – it is not clear how class groups are affected; in these cases the public is 
unable to bring resentment of the rich and sympathy for the poor to bear on policy opinion.  
 
Introduction 
 Public opinion about government redistribution matters; it affects public policy, and 
concomitantly distributional outcomes in the United States (Brooks and Manza 2007; Kelly 
2011; Pacheco 2009; Page and Shapiro 1992). Coming to terms with public opinion about 
government redistribution would help scholars answer the central question of political science: 
“who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell 1936). 
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 Interestingly, as pointed out in Chapter 2, scholars express considerable disagreement 
about the extent to which Americans support downward redistribution – defined for the purposes 
of this project as government policies that are intended either to aid those at the bottom of the 
economic distribution, to take from those at the top of the economic distribution, or both. Some 
scholars motivate their research from the starting point that American support for downward 
redistribution is low (Hochschild 1981; see also Bartels 2008), while others argue that support 
for downward redistribution, while low in comparison to Europe (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser 2004; 
Manza and Brooks 2007; Smith 1987; Svallfors 2004) is higher than is commonly believed 
(Cook and Barrett 1992; Gilens 1999; Page and Jacobs 2009). 
 Both sides of the debate have some explaining to do. Those who argue that American 
support for downward redistribution is low face many counterexamples: majorities of Americans 
support not only inclusive welfare programs (for which everyone is eligible) such as Social 
Security but also means-tested programs (for which one has to demonstrate a lack of means to be 
eligible) such as Supplemental Security Income, Head Start, and the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(e.g., Cook and Barrett 1992; Gilens 1999). Moreover, support for many downwardly 
redistributive programs remains high even when respondents are asked whether they would be 
willing to pay more taxes in order to fund these programs (Page and Jacobs 2009). Such 
responses cannot be easily dismissed as “cheap talk” in a cost-free survey environment, since 
both cross-national and within-U.S. studies show that public opinion patterns are associated with 
redistributive policy (Brooks and Manza 2007; Kelly 2011; Pacheco 2009; Page and Shapiro 
1992). 
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 At the same time, those who argue that American support for downward redistribution is 
high also face important counterexamples. If majorities of Americans believe that the wealthy do 
not pay their fair share in taxes,20 why is the estate tax, which only affects the wealthy, so 
unpopular (Bartels 2008; Hochschild 1981)? Similarly, why do policies that disproportionately 
benefit the rich, such as the home mortgage interest tax deduction and the retirement savings 
deduction, enjoy so much support (Howard 2004; Mettler 2011)?    
In this chapter, I seek to explain both the broad pattern of support for downward 
redistribution and some notable exceptions to this pattern. I do so by focusing on a very different 
explanator from that examined by previous scholarship: attitudes toward the class groups of the 
rich and the poor. The previous chapter demonstrated that on balance, Americans view the rich 
with resentment and the poor with sympathy. In this chapter, I show that these powerful class 
group attitudes lead large proportions of Americans to support policies that are perceived to incur 
costs on the rich and provide benefits to the poor. Critically, however, for some policies it is not 
clear who pays the costs and who reaps the benefits; in these cases many Americans do not bring 
their class group attitudes to bear on their policy opinions, resulting in policy positions 
inconsistent with the general pattern of support for downward redistribution. 
 I make my case through a series of empirical analyses, each of which examines the 
results of a 2012 two-wave survey of a Mechanical Turk sample of 1,384 adults (Berinsky et al 
2012). I begin by examining associations between sympathy for the poor, resentment of the rich, 
and opinion about redistributive policy. Next, I examine differences in perceptions of who pays 
the cost of the estate tax, in order to assess whether resentment of the rich bolsters support for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Pew polls from March 2003 and December 2011 at:  
http://www.people-press.org/2011/12/20/tax-system-seen-as-unfair-in-need-of-overhaul/ 
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estate tax among those who realize that only a small percentage of Americans are affected by the 
tax. Finally, capitalizing on a within-subjects design, I examine the effects of providing subjects 
with information about who benefits from a given policy.   
 
 
 
Relationships between Class Group Attitudes and Policy Opinion 
 Do sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich predict public opinion? As argued in 
Chapter 3, this depends on whether a given redistributive policy is seen as such by the public; 
whether, that is, it is perceived to benefit the rich or the poor. In such cases, I hypothesize that 
sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich will be brought to bear on public opinion about 
the policy. 
 In this section, I present the results of a series of ordinary least squares regression models 
(results are robust to an ordered logistic specification) in which the dependent variables are 
answers to questions measuring opinion about a variety of redistributive policies. The first set of 
policies consists of either government assistance to a group (poor, homeless) or increased taxes 
on a group (those making more than $250,000/year). While these policies potentially have 
redistributive consequences, it is not made explicit where the money is coming from, in the case 
of government assistance, or where the money is going, in the case of increased taxes. The next 
two policies, in contrast, explicitly mention redistribution: the first entails redistribution through 
heavy taxes on the rich, and the second involves government taking an active role in reducing the 
gap between rich and poor. The final policy question brings self-interest into the mix, examining 
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whether the respondent would be willing to pay increased taxes to ensure that no one lives under 
the poverty line. Notably, for all policy attitudes in this set of analyses, at least one class group is 
explicitly named as a potential beneficiary (or victim).  
 Across this variation in policy type, we see a robust, substantively large, and statistically 
significant relationship between resentment of the rich, sympathy for the poor, and policy 
opinion; critically, these relationships are evident even after controlling for principles, 
partisanship, ideology, and demographics. Effect sizes range from one-tenth to more than one-
half of the scale. As expected, the role of sympathy for the poor is greatest for the policies 
explicitly naming the poor or the homeless as recipients, while the role of resentment of the rich 
is greatest for those policies targeting the relatively well off. Interestingly, however, resentment 
of the rich and sympathy for the poor have an effect that is independent of each other in nearly 
every case. In general, the associations are greater between resentment of the rich and policy 
opinion than between sympathy for the poor and policy opinion, although the difference between 
the two disappears when egalitarianism and humanitarianism – which are highly correlated with 
sympathy for the poor – are dropped from the model. 
[Insert Table 5.1 about here] 
 
The Mystery of Opposition to the Estate Tax Revisited 
 I next turn to an important exception to the pattern of support for downward 
redistribution: the puzzling unpopularity of the estate tax (e.g., Bartels 2008). One possible 
explanation for this unpopularity is political ignorance – but existing efforts have uncovered 
mixed evidence in support of this proposition (e.g., Bartels 2008; Krupnikov et al. 2006; Slemrod 
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2006). I depart from previous research in three ways. First, I ask about support for the estate tax 
rather than support for estate tax repeal, potentially decreasing confusion eliminating from 
double negatives; what it means to “not support estate tax repeal” may be hard to parse, 
increasing error in the measure of the dependent variable, which would make it more difficult for 
scholars to find effects. Second, I employ a more nuanced measure of perceptions about 
eligibility for the estate tax; previous research either relied on general measures of political 
knowledge (Bartels 2008) or a five-category measure of perceptions of eligibility that may have 
discarded important variation (Slemrod 2006). In contrast, I ask respondents to enter the 
percentage of households they think hold large enough estates to be eligible for the estate tax; 
consistent with previous findings of public ignorance about the tax, only 9% of respondents 
correctly gave a response that was less than 5%.21  
 The account presented here would suggest that those respondents who believe that the 
estate tax affects only the wealthiest of households would oppose the tax due to resentment of the 
rich. As a test of this hypothesis, another ordinary least squares regression is estimated, identical 
to the above model except that perceptions of estate tax eligibility are interacted with resentment 
of the rich. Indeed, the marginal effects plot presented in Figure 5.1 shows that resentment of the 
rich is a powerful predictor of opposition to the estate tax, accounting for over half the scale at 
the extreme in which only the smallest percentage of households are eligible for the tax – but, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This may be an underestimate of respondents’ knowledge, given that Krupnikov and 
colleagues (2006) find that monetary incentives for correct answers, which were not provided in 
the survey presented here, increase the proportion of correct answers. 
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consistent with expectations, resentment of the rich does not predict opinion at the other end of 
the scale.22  
[Insert Figure 5.1 about here] 
 In short, the results presented here suggest that opposition to the estate tax can be 
explained as follows: the vast majority of people do not understand that only the wealthiest 
households are affected by this tax. Among those who do understand this, resentment of the rich 
leads them to oppose the tax.   
 
A Within-Subjects Approach 
 The above analyses suggest that Americans support downwardly redistributive policies 
when it is clear how the rich and poor are affected by such policies, due to resentment of the rich 
and sympathy for the poor, but that when it is not clear how these groups are affected, American 
support for downward redistribution is more tenuous. However, these analyses rely on cross-
sectional data, limiting the confidence in the causal inferences that can be drawn. Therefore, I 
now employ a within-subjects design, replicating and extending the research of Mettler (2011). 
In wave 1, respondents were asked to report their opinion about three policies for which the 
affected class groups may not be clear: the home mortgage interest tax deduction (HMITD), the 
retirement savings tax deduction (RSTD), and the earned income tax credit (EITC). In wave 2 
(approximately two weeks later), respondents were again asked their opinion about these 
policies, but only after being presented with graphs describing the distributive benefits of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This interactive effect is sizable for both Democrats and Republicans, although it is somewhat 
larger for Republicans. 
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policies (available from Mettler 2011) – in short, the HMITD and the RSTD primarily benefit the 
rich, while the EITC benefits the poor.  
 Mettler finds that information about the impact of these policies on class groups leads 
respondents to take a position that is more consistent with broad patterns of support for 
downward redistribution. Of particular interest to the current project is why information should 
have this effect. I test the hypothesis that information allows respondents to bring their class 
group attitudes to bear on policy opinion in Table 5.2.  
[Table 5.2 about here] 
 The table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions: for each column in the 
table, the dependent variable is policy opinion. Each policy has three columns of regression 
coefficients: in the first column, the dependent variable is responses to the policy question at 
wave 1; in the second column, the dependent variable is responses at wave 2; and in the third 
column, capitalizing on the within-subjects design, the dependent variable is the difference 
between wave 2 opinion and wave 1 opinion. As expected, the effect of resentment of the rich is 
significantly greater after information is presented for the HMITD and the RSTD; the effect of 
sympathy for the poor on EITC opinion is also greater in wave 2, but the relationship is not 
statistically significant. This null finding is attributable to sympathy for the poor’s high 
correlation with humanitarianism (which does significantly increase when information is 
presented); when humanitarianism is removed from the equation, the association between 
sympathy for the poor and opinion about the EITC increases substantially between wave 1 and 
wave 2. In short, I find that information about distributive benefits leads individuals to take a 
more progressive position on policy opinions because this information allows them to bring class 
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group attitudes to bear on their judgments, leading to greater support for downward 
redistribution. 
Conclusion 
 Scholars have long struggled to explain public support for downwardly redistributive 
policies (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), which is more widespread than many believe (Cook 
and Barrett 1992; Gilens 1999; Page and Jacobs 2009). This is a problem given the consequences 
of public opinion for distributive outcomes (Brooks and Manza 2007; Kelly 2011; Pacheco 2009; 
Page and Shapiro 1992). After all, as Cook and Barrett (1992, pg. 7) point out, “in 1900…neither 
the government nor industry offered citizens any protection against the normal risks of life. 
Should ordinary workers become sick, disabled, unemployed, or even unable to work merely 
because of age, their families would be forced to live in poverty and to depend on charity.” 
Today, in contrast, the United States has, to name a few, “national systems of old age insurance, 
unemployment insurance, sanitation mandates for tenements and factories, maximum work hour 
laws, minimum wage laws, and child labor legislation.” Indeed, many Americans depend on 
such programs as Supplemental Security Income, Social Security, and the Earned Income Tax 
Credit to keep financial crisis at bay: in the absence of such programs, the poverty rate would 
climb significantly (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). Public support for downward redistribution, in 
short plays a key role in propping up the welfare state, and therefore warrants explanation. 
 At the same time, there are some notable exceptions to the general tendency for 
majorities of Americans to favor downward redistribution: in particular, the estate tax, which is 
downwardly redistributive, is relatively unpopular (Bartels 2008) while the home mortgage tax 
 64	  
deduction and the retirement savings tax deduction, upwardly distributive policies, are relatively 
popular (Mettler 2011).  
 In an attempt to explain both the broad pattern of public support for downward 
redistribution and the notable exceptions to this pattern, I develop and test a theory of the effects 
of attitudes toward the rich and poor. Relying on a two-wave panel study, I begin by validating 
measures of these concepts, and next examine their relationships with policy opinion. I find first 
that the broad pattern of support for downward redistribution is the result of resentment of the 
rich and sympathy for the poor. However, this pattern is only evident for policies for which it is 
clear how these class groups are affected. For policies for which the beneficiaries/victims of a 
policy are unclear, such as the estate tax, the home mortgage tax deduction, and the retirement 
savings tax deduction, the public is less likely to take a position in favor of downward 
redistribution than they would if they possessed more information about the distributive benefits.  
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Table 5.1 Resentment of the Rich and Sympathy for the Poor Predict Policy Opinion When 
Affected Group is Clear. 
 
Aid to 
Poor 
Aid to 
Homeless 
Tax 
250k+ 
Redist. by Taxing 
Rich 
Reduce Rich/Poor 
Gap 
Resp. Pay Taxes to Reduce 
Poverty 
Resent. Rich 0.07** 0.10* 0.51*** 0.60*** 0.43*** 0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Symp. Poor 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.08* 0.12 0.11 0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Humanitarianism -0.02 0.08 0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Limited Govt. -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.18*** -0.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Egalitarianism 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Rac. Resentment -0.01 -0.01 0.07*** 0.06* -0.01 -0.07* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Stereotypes -0.11* -0.04 0.20*** -0.00 -0.02 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Party ID (Rep) -0.05* 0.03 -0.11*** 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Ideology (Cons) -0.07** -0.10** -0.18*** -0.15** -0.10* 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Latino 0.02 0.01 -0.05** -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Black 0.05** -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Other Race 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05* 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Male 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Some Grad Sch. -0.06*** -0.09*** 0.02 -0.08** -0.12*** -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
College Grad -0.03* -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.07** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Some College -0.03* -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.09*** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Inc: 20-35k -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Inc: 25-50k -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Inc: 50-75k -0.04** -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Inc: 75k+ -0.07*** -0.05* -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Unemployed -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.26*** 0.24** 0.37*** 0.12 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
N 1,384 521 1,385 521 521 521 
R-squared 0.46 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.59 0.43 
Cell entries are OLS regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The N’s vary depending on whether the 
question was asked in Wave 1 or Wave 2; ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 (two-tailed); all variables coded 0 to 1. 
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Table 5.2. The Effect of Class Group Attitudes on Policy Opinion Depends on Information about Distributive Benefits. 
 
MITD at  
wave 1 
MITD at  
wave 2 MITD Diff. 
RSTD at  
wave 1 
RSTD at  
wave 2 RSTD Diff. 
EITC at  
wave 1 
EITC at  
wave 2 EITC Diff. 
Resent. Rich -0.03 -0.27*** -0.12*** -0.07 -0.29*** -0.11*** 0.13* 0.24*** 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) 
Symp. Poor 0.06 -0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.07 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) 
Humanitarianism 0.19*** -0.03 -0.11** 0.18*** 0.06 -0.06 0.12* 0.30*** 0.09** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) 
Egalitarianism -0.02 0.05 0.03* -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.06* -0.07** -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Limited Govt. -0.07 -0.08 -0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.09 0.14** 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Racial Resentment 0.07* 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.09** -0.01 -0.05** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
Stereotype Index 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.11 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.07) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07) 
Party ID (Rep.) -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 -0.12* -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Ideology (Cons.) 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) 
Constant 0.40*** 0.67*** 0.63*** 0.37*** 0.73*** 0.68*** 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.45*** 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06) 
N 519 519 519 520 520 520 520 520 520 
R-squared 0.06 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.34 0.13 
Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses);  
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10 (two-tailed); all variables coded 0 to 1; 
“MITD” signifies support for the Mortgage Interest Tax Deduction; “RSTD” signifies support for the Retirement Savings Tax Deduction; “EITC” signifies 
support for the Earned Income Tax Credit; “Diff.” signifies the within-individual difference in policy opinion: wave 2 opinion minus wave 1 opinion. 
Coefficients on demographic control variables (same as those in Table 2) suppressed. 
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Figure 5.1 Effect of Resentment of the Rich on Estate Tax Approval, by Perceptions of 
How Many Households are Affected by the Tax 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Effects of Sympathy for the Poor and Resentment of the Rich on Candidate Evaluations 
 
Introduction 
 While many scholars have argued that Americans are opposed to economic inequality, I 
demonstrated in Chapter 4 that on balance, Americans believe the poor to have too little, and 
accordingly view them with sympathy; the rich, meanwhile, are viewed to have too much, and 
are therefore targets of resentment. Furthermore, in Chapter 5, I showed that sympathy for the 
poor and resentment of the rich also bolster public support for many downwardly redistributive 
policies. In this chapter, I present evidence in support of the contention that Americans seek to 
reward candidates who help the poor, and punish candidates who help the rich, in the voting 
booth. Contrary to conventional accounts of American indifference, opposition to economic 
inequality powerfully shapes candidate evaluations in the United States. 
 
Observational Analyses: Class Group Attitudes and Candidate Support 
 I begin this section with an analysis of the associations between class group attitudes and 
evaluations of the two-major party nominees in the 2012 presidential election. Furthermore, in 
order to assess the extent to which any patterns apply more generally to evaluations of political 
entities on the left and the right, I extend the scope of the analyses to include the two major 
parties and two social movements. A series of ordinary least squares regression models are 
estimated in which the dependent variables are feeling thermometers for Obama, Romney, 
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Democrats, Republicans, the Tea Party, and Occupy Wall Street. The independent variables of 
interest are sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich, and the controls include 
partisanship, ideology, racial stereotypes, and demographics. The coefficient estimates are 
presented in Table 6.1; all variables are coded 0 to 1. 
  Before examining the results, it is worth remembering that the United States is closely on 
the heels of a presidential election in which both major-party candidates largely avoided 
pledging to help the poor (Herbert 2012). Indeed, during a CNN interview23 Romney made it a 
point to claim that he was “not concerned about the very poor.” Although he later backtracked, it 
is unlikely that the statement was a slip of the tongue; in the same interview, Romney said, “We 
will hear from the Democrat Party, the plight of the poor...You can focus on the very poor, that's 
not my focus.” Romney appeared to be making a strategic decision to contrast himself with 
Obama, calculating that whichever one of the two was perceived to help the poor more would be 
more likely to lose the votes of the “90-95 percent of Americans” with whom Romney professed 
to be more concerned.  
 In retrospect, it appears that Romney might have done well to associate himself with the 
poor: Table 6.1 shows that sympathy for the poor is positively associated with warmth toward 
Obama, and the magnitude of the effect is almost one-quarter of the scale and statistically 
significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Furthermore, as might be expected given that Democrats are 
perceived to “own” the issue of helping the poor (Petrocik 1996), sympathy for the poor is also 
positively associated with warmth toward Democrats; the magnitude of the effect is nearly one-
fifth of the scale of the dependent variable and statistically significant (p < 0.01, two-tailed). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Last accessed March 16, 2013: http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/01/mitt-romney-
middle-income-americans-are-focus-not-very-poor/ 
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Sympathy for the poor does not predict evaluations of Romney or the Republican Party. Turning 
to evaluations of social movements, a somewhat more modest association with attitudes about 
the poor is evident, ranging from 6-7 percentage points; sympathy for the poor is negatively 
associated with warmth toward the Tea Party (p < 0.05, two-tailed) and positively associated 
with warmth toward the Occupy Wall Street Movement (p < 0.05, two-tailed). 
 Resentment of the rich is also implicated in evaluations of political entities. While it does 
not predict evaluations of the Democratic Party, it is positively associated with warmth toward 
Obama and negatively associated with warmth toward Romney and the Republican Party. In all 
three cases the magnitude of the association is substantively large, ranging from 16 to 21 
percentage points and statistically significant (p < 0.05, two-tailed). Turning again to evaluations 
of social movements, we see that resentment of the rich is not associated with warmth toward the 
Tea Party, but it is positively associated with warmth toward the Occupy Wall Street movement 
– as might be expected, given that this movement explicitly singled out the “1 percent” as 
undeserving. The magnitude of the relationship is again large, at about one-fifth of the scale, and 
the coefficient is statistically distinguishable from zero (p < 0.01, two-tailed). These results, 
which are robust to a variety of specifications, support the contention that attitudes about the 
poor and the rich are implicated in political judgments.  
[Insert Table 6.1 about here] 
 To what extent are these associations time-bound? In the aftermath of the Great 
Recession and Occupy Wall Street, it is possible that political rhetoric about class is more 
common than it was in previous years, potentially raising the relevance of class group attitudes to 
evaluations of political entities. Furthermore, Romney’s reputation for vast personal wealth 
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might have made him uniquely vulnerable to the effects of resentment of the rich. To assess 
these possibilities, I again turn to the ANES and examine associations between feeling 
thermometers toward the poor and the rich and two sets of dependent variables. The first set 
consists of presidential candidate evaluations: the thermometer score for the Republican 
candidate is subtracted from the score for the Democratic candidate. Accordingly, the models 
with these dependent variables are ordinary least squares regressions. The second set of 
dependent variables is vote choice in presidential elections: “0” if the respondent voted for the 
Democratic candidate, and “1” if the respondent voted for the Republican (all others excluded). 
Due to the structure of the dependent variable, these models are binomial logistic regressions. 
 I conduct these analyses for the only three presidential election years in which 
thermometers about both the poor and the rich are included in the same survey: 2004, 2008, and 
2012. The key independent variable is constructed as follows: in order to deal with the problem 
of “interpersonal incomparability” in feeling thermometer scores (Brady 1988), I subtract the 
rich thermometer from the poor thermometer; using this differential as the independent variable 
of interest corrects for the tendency for a given respondent to rate any group positively or 
negatively (see Kinder and McConnaughy 2006 for a similar approach in the domain of racial 
attitudes). Control variables24 include party identification, racial stereotypes, sociotropic 
evaluations of the economy, and demographics. As in previous analyses, all variables are coded 
from 0 to 1; the coefficient estimates are presented in Table 6.2. 
 I first examine the results of the models in which the dependent variables are candidate 
feeling thermometer scores. Here the relationships can be interpreted easily, as I use ordinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ideology is not included in specifications using ANES data, as the question wording invites 
many respondents not to answer, leading to a substantial decrease in sample size. 
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least squares regression models; in all three election years, rating the poor more favorably than 
the rich is positively associated with preference for the Democratic candidate over the 
Republican candidate. The magnitude of this relationship ranges from 13 to 17 percentage 
points, and is statistically significant all three years at p < 0.01 (two-tailed). 
 Turning to the vote choice models, we see that in all three election years, rating the poor 
more favorably than the rich is positively associated with vote choice for the Democratic 
presidential candidate over the Republican, although this association is only statistically 
significant in 2004 and 2012. The magnitude of the effect is not easily interpretable from the 
coefficient table, given the ordered logit specifications; predicted probabilities, in which control 
variables are set to their mean, are required. These reveal that movement from the lowest to the 
highest point on the poor/rich differential scale is associated with a 23 percentage point increase 
in the likelihood of voting for the Democratic candidate in 2004, a 4 percentage point 
(statistically indistinguishable from zero) increase in the likelihood of voting Democrat in 2008, 
and a 32 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting Democrat in 2012. 
[Insert Table 6.2 about here]  
 To be sure, it is difficult to determine the direction of causation in any observational 
analysis. Accordingly, in the next section I present the results of a survey experiment addressing 
the relationship between candidate evaluations and one of the two class group attitudes examined 
so far: sympathy for the poor. In future research, I will conduct a similar experiment examining 
the role of resentment of the rich. 
 
Experimental Analysis: Activating Class Group Attitudes Across Partisan Lines 
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 The survey experiment presented here builds on the observational analyses as follows. 
First, the experimental design has a key advantage: experiments are well-suited to test 
hypotheses about causation, as they are designed to isolate effects (Kinder and Palfrey 1993). 
Second, the experiment is constructed to test the strength of the Democratic advantage with 
respect to sympathy for the poor (putting resentment of the rich aside for the moment) noted 
above. That is, the analyses so far suggest that Democrats appear to benefit from sympathy for 
the poor (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2), due to their “ownership” of this issue (Petrocik 1996; see also 
Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). But are there any conditions under which Republican candidates could 
benefit from sympathy for the poor? What if a Republican candidate were to signal that if 
elected, his/her actions would benefit the poor? Such a strategy might marshal the powerful force 
of sympathy for the poor on the Republican candidate’s behalf; alternatively, it might be that the 
Democrats’ ownership of this issue is too strong for such a strategy to be effective.  
 Respondents (YouGov-Polimetrix dataset) were exposed to a description of a fictitious 
candidate (they were not informed that the candidate is fictitious) for U.S. Congress named Bob 
Taylor and then asked their level of support for the candidate. Afterward, measures of sympathy 
for the poor and questions measuring control variables were asked, with the exception of 
demographics, which were already included as part of YouGov-Polimetrix’s respondent profile. 
As with any experiment in which attitude questions are asked after the manipulation, it is 
important to assess whether experimental condition affected responses to the questions: ordinary 
least squares regression analyses of class group attitudes on experimental conditions revealed no 
evidence that this was the case (Appendix 6.1). 
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 The logic behind the experimental design is straightforward: Kinder and Dale-Riddle 
(2011) argue that if candidates “are seen as standing for or against certain social groups, voters 
will be attracted or driven away, depending on their attitude toward the groups in question.” 
Accordingly, the experimental component of the survey manipulates whether the description of a 
hypothetical candidate for U.S. Congress indicates that he would be likely to “help” rather than 
“hurt” the poor, based on his record in the state legislature. The candidate’s partisanship is also 
manipulated: no partisan cue is provided, the candidate is a Democrat, or the candidate is a 
Republican. One potential problem with this design is that any effects of the manipulation might 
reflect respondent reactions to the words “help” and “hurt” rather than respondent attitudes about 
the poor; therefore, as a control, two conditions are included that suggest that the candidate 
might “help” or “hurt” the district as a whole. The experimental conditions and sample text from 
the stimuli are presented in Figure 6.1; all of the following analyses are weighted to approximate 
national representativeness. 
[Insert Figure 6.1 about here] 
 If the poor are objects of resentment, as some argue,25 we might expect that a candidate 
would be rewarded in conditions in which he would be likely to decrease aid to the poor. 
Alternatively, if Americans are ambivalent about helping the poor (Hochschild 1981; Newman 
and Jacobs 2010), or indifferent to class when making political judgments, the candidate might 
be evaluated similarly across conditions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 From “The New Resentment of the Poor.” The New York Times, August 30, 2011. Last 
accessed at:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/opinion/the-new-resentment-of-the-poor.html?_r=0 
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 But the findings are inconsistent with these expectations. Figure 6.2, which presents 
mean support for candidate Taylor (recoded on a 0-1 scale), shows that the candidate is more 
popular when his record indicates that he would be likely to help the poor. Since, in the non-
partisan condition, there is little additional information about the candidate, I also examine the 
two partisan conditions, finding that the candidate is preferred when he is likely to help the poor 
regardless of whether he is a Democrat or a Republican. The magnitude of this effect is 
substantively meaningful, ranging from 6 to 13 percentage points,26 and statistically significant at 
conventional levels (p < 0.05, two-tailed).  
[Insert Figure 6.2 about here] 
 If my argument is correct that sympathy for the poor is responsible for these results, it 
should be those respondents who score high on sympathy for the poor that are driving the effects. 
Therefore, I estimate a series of ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent 
variable is support for the candidate, and experimental conditions are interacted with sympathy 
for the poor. Furthermore, in order to address a potential alternative explanation, in each of the 
models I include two additional interactions: one between experimental condition and 
partisanship, and another between experimental condition and subscription to the principle of 
limited government (Markus 2001). The reason for this decision is that even if those who are 
sympathetic to the poor are more likely to support a candidate who would help the poor, this 
could result from inferences respondents make about the candidate. For example, respondents 
who are sympathetic to the poor are more likely to be Democrats (Table 4.1, Chapter 4), and they 
might infer that a candidate who would help the poor is a Democrat as well. This might result in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The effect is more than twice as large for the Democratic candidate as for the Republican 
candidate, but this difference-in-differences is not statistically significant (p < 0.30, two-tailed). 
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a spurious relationship between sympathy for the poor and candidate support. Including the 
interaction between partisanship and experimental condition controls for this possibility. 
 In analyses with interaction terms, as Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) write, “the 
typical results table often conveys very little information of interest.” Moreover, accurate 
interpretation of interactions requires the examination of marginal effects of the interaction 
components. Marginal effects plots are therefore presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4; for those 
interested, the tables of coefficient estimates are provided in Appendices 6.2-6.5. 
[Insert Figure 6.3 about here] 
 Figure 6.3a examines the conditions in which the candidate is non-partisan and the 
candidate’s association with the poor is manipulated. As expected, it is only among those at the 
high end of the sympathy scale that support for the candidate is higher in the condition in which 
the candidate would help the poor. Among those at the low end of the scale, support for the 
candidate is actually lower in the condition in which the candidate would help the poor, but this 
association does not reach conventional standards of statistical significance.  
 In order to address an additional alternative explanation, the conditions in which the 
candidate would either “help” or “hurt” the district are examined in Figure 6.3b. A markedly 
different pattern is evident: sympathy for the poor is not associated with support for the 
candidate when the help/hurt manipulation refers to “the district” rather than “the poor.” This 
suggests that it is not the candidate’s stance toward “helping” in general, but rather helping the 
poor in particular, which drives the differences in candidate support across conditions.  
 But does the interactive relationship between sympathy for the poor and experimental 
condition persist in the presence of a partisan cue? Indeed it does, as Figure 6.4a (Democrat) and 
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6.4b (Republican) reveal. The patterns are virtually identical to that observed in the non-partisan 
conditions; these results suggest that Republican candidates have the potential to activate 
sympathy for the poor on their behalf. 
[Insert Figure 6.4 about here] 
 An additional potential alternative explanation for the results is the possibility that social 
desirability pressures bias self-reporting. That is, a subset of respondents might feel compelled 
by social norms to report that they are sympathetic to the poor even if they really are not, and 
that same subset might, for the same reason, report that they would support a candidate who 
would help the poor even if they really would not. In order to assess this possibility, I employ a 
self-monitoring scale that identifies people who are more (or less) likely to monitor their 
behavior to ensure it is consistent with social norms; for example, high self-monitors are less 
likely to report racial prejudice than low self-monitors (Berinsky 2004; Berinsky and Lavine 
2012). Splitting the sample at the median, I find that the results for high and low self-monitors 
are virtually identical; the results do not appear to be moderated by social desirability pressures. 
[Insert Figure 6.5 about here] 
 I next assess the possibility that the effects of sympathy for the poor differ by partisan 
group; perhaps, for example, those Republicans who sympathize with the poor prefer to help the 
poor by donating to charity rather than supporting candidates who would increase government 
aid to the poor. To the contrary: the patterns are virtually identical across partisan lines. Among 
Republicans as well as Democrats, those high in sympathy for the poor are more likely to 
support candidates who would help the poor. 
[Insert Figure 6.6 about here] 
 79	  
  
 
Conclusion 
 The observational analyses presented in this section suggest that sympathy for the poor 
and resentment of the rich underpin support for political entities on the left, Obama, the 
Democratic Party, and the Occupy Wall Street movement, and bolster opposition to political 
entities on the right: Romney, the Republican Party, and the Tea Party. Moreover, these class 
group attitudes are associated with vote choice, yielding a net advantage for the Democrats; this 
pattern extends beyond the present historical moment, preceding the “Great Recession” and 
Occupy Wall Street.  
 The experiment demonstrates that at least in the case of sympathy for the poor, the 
Democratic advantage is not inevitable. Candidates who help the poor are more popular than 
candidates who hurt the poor, and sympathy for the poor moderates this effect – these patterns 
extend to both Democratic and Republican candidates. Moreover, these results cannot be 
explained away by respondent partisanship, ideology, the “help/hurt” terminology employed in 
the experiment, or social desirability pressures. The findings suggest that sympathy for the poor 
is a powerful force shaping candidate evaluations; furthermore, both Democratic and Republican 
candidates have the potential to activate sympathy for the poor to their benefit. 
 Sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich, then, are powerful forces that underpin 
not only opinion about policy but also evaluations of candidates for public office. In the final 
chapter, I return to the broad questions motivating this dissertation: how do Americans feel about 
economic inequality and government-led downward redistribution?
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Table 6.1. Attitudes toward the Rich and Poor and Evaluations of Political Entities 
 
YouGov-Polimetrix Study 
 Obama Romney Democrats Republicans 
Sympathy for the Poor 0.23*** -0.05 0.18*** -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Resentment of the Rich 0.16** -0.21*** 0.09 -0.17*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Party ID (Rep.) -0.57*** 0.38*** -0.57*** 0.40*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ideology (Cons.) -0.31*** 0.38*** -0.26*** 0.26*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Neg. Black Stereotypes -0.12 0.16** 0.04 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Constant 0.80*** -0.04 0.78*** 0.11 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
N 698 714 714 727 
R-squared 0.59 0.49 0.61 0.46 
 
Mechanical Turk Study 
 Tea Party Occupy Wall Street 
Sympathy for the Poor -0.06** 0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Resentment of the Rich -0.02 0.20*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Party ID (Rep) 0.23*** -0.11*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Ideology (Cons) 0.21*** 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Limited Government 0.09*** -0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Neg. Black Stereotypes 0.05 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Racial Resentment 0.17*** -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.07 0.67*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
N 1,386 1,387 
R-squared 0.37 0.33 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. All 
variables coded 0 to 1. Dependent variables are feeling thermometer scores (column heading). In the YouGov-
Polimetrix analysis, coefficients on the following control variables are suppressed due to space limitations: age, 
gender, marital status, region, education, race, class identity. In the Mechanical Turk analyses, the suppressed 
coefficients are: gender, education, race, income, and labor force participation. In the YouGov-Polimetrix study, the 
analyses are weighted to approximate national representativeness. 
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Table 6.2. Class Attitudes, Presidential Candidate Evaluations, and Vote Choice Over Time 
 
 2004   2008   2012   
 
Dem./Rep. 
Therm. 
Differential 
Dem.  
Vote 
Choice 
Dem./Rep. 
Therm. 
Differential 
Dem.  
Vote 
Choice 
Dem./Rep. 
Therm. 
Differential 
Dem.  
Vote 
Choice 
Poor/Rich  
Thermometer 
Differential 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
 
2.49* 
(1.35) 
 
0.17*** 
(0.04) 
 
0.42 
(1.15) 
 
0.13*** 
(0.05) 
 
3.46** 
(1.49) 
 
Party ID (Rep.) -0.45*** -5.80*** -0.41*** -5.87*** -0.57*** -7.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.55) (0.02) (0.42) (0.02) (0.69) 
Age -0.07** -0.29 -0.09*** -1.02** -0.06** -0.35 
 (0.03) (0.68) (0.02) (0.48) (0.03) (0.54) 
Education 0.06** 0.38 -0.05 -2.09** -0.00 1.02* 
 (0.03) (0.59) (0.04) (0.87) (0.02) (0.58) 
Male -0.00 -0.30 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 0.16 
 (0.01) (0.29) (0.01) (0.23) (0.01) (0.30) 
South -0.04*** -0.11 -0.03*** -0.52** -0.00 0.48 
 (0.01) (0.33) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01) (0.30) 
Income 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.33 -0.02 -0.37 
 (0.03) (0.56) (0.02) (0.46) (0.02) (0.59) 
Married -0.03** 0.21 -0.02** -0.47** -0.02 -0.60** 
 (0.01) (0.30) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.30) 
White -0.02 -0.80** -0.04*** -1.23*** -0.03** -0.83*** 
 (0.02) (0.36) (0.01) (0.22) (0.01) (0.29) 
Racial Attitudes -0.19** -3.96** -0.27*** -3.92*** -0.11** -2.70** 
 (0.08) (1.59) (0.05) (1.38) (0.05) (1.32) 
Economy Worse 0.23*** 3.23*** 0.09*** 0.78 -0.09*** -1.51*** 
 (0.03) (0.62) (0.03) (0.66) (0.02) (0.53) 
Constant 0.61*** 2.27* 0.81*** 7.65*** 0.93*** 4.33*** 
 (0.06) (1.29) (0.05) (1.38) (0.05) (1.29) 
N 1,049 855 2,028 1,612 1456 1062 
R-squared/F-stat 0.62 14.07 0.54 23.79 0.64 14.07 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; cell entries are regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. 
Column heading indicates the dependent variables: “Dem./Rep. Therm. Differential” indicates that the dependent 
variable is coded as follows: the feeling thermometer score for the Republican presidential candidate is subtracted 
from the feeling thermometer score for the Democratic presidential candidate; ordinary least squares regressions 
are used to estimate models with these dependent variables. “Dem. Vote Choice” indicates that the dependent 
variable is “1” if the respondent reported voting for the Democratic candidate, “0” if the respondent reported 
voting for the Republican candidate. All variables coded 0 to 1. Data are from American National Election Studies 
time series surveys. 
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Figure 6.1 Experimental Design 
 
Figure 6.1a. Conditions 
 No party cue Democrat Republican 
Helped poor X X X 
Hurt poor X X X 
Helped district X -- -- 
Hurt district X -- -- 
The experiment is not fully factorial; those conditions that are included in the survey are marked 
with an “X.” 
 
Figure 6.1b. Sample Text 
 
Help Poor/Republican Condition 
Would Bob Taylor help the poor in our district? 
 
Bob Taylor is a member of his state’s House of Representatives who is planning to run for 
the United States Congress in 2014. A member of the Republican Party, and a practicing 
attorney, Taylor describes himself as a family man: he has two daughters. 
 
While in the state legislature, Taylor’s initiatives were often designed to increase government 
aid to the poor, attracting both praise and criticism.  
 
 
Hurt Poor/Non-Partisan Condition 
Would Bob Taylor hurt the poor in our district? 
 
Bob Taylor is a member of his state’s House of Representatives who is planning to run for 
the United States Congress in 2014. A practicing attorney, Taylor describes himself as a 
family man: he has two daughters. 
 
While in the state legislature, Taylor’s initiatives were often designed to decrease 
government aid to the poor, attracting both praise and criticism.  
 
 
Help District/Non-Partisan Condition 
Would Bob Taylor help our district? 
 
Bob Taylor is a member of his state’s House of Representatives who is planning to run for 
the United States Congress in 2014. A practicing attorney, Taylor describes himself as a 
family man: he has two daughters. 
 
While in the state legislature, Taylor’s initiatives attracted both praise and criticism.  
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Figure 6.2. Effects of Candidate’s Record on Mean Support for the Candidate 
 
Support for the Congressional candidate (coded from 0 to 1) is on the y-axis. Regardless of the 
candidate’s party, support for the candidate is higher if the candidate’s record includes 
initiatives designed to help the poor. 
 
0.3	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Figure 6.3 Marginal Effect of Candidate’s Record on Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor (Candidate is non-Partisan) 
 
Figure 6.3a. Marginal Effect of Candidate Helping the Poor 
(See Appendix 6.2 for the table of coefficient estimates.) 
 
Figure 6.3b. Marginal Effect of Candidate Helping the District 
(See Appendix 6.3 for the table of coefficient estimates.) 
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Figure 6.4. Marginal Effect of Candidate’s Record on Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor (Candidate is Partisan) 
 
Figure 6.4a. Candidate is a Democrat 
(See Appendix 6.4 for the table of coefficient estimates.) 
 
Figure 6.4b. Candidate is a Republican 
(See Appendix 6.5 for the table of coefficient estimates.) 
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Figure 6.5. Marginal Effect of Candidate’s Record on Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor (Candidate is non-Partisan) 
 
6.5a. Marginal Effect of Candidate Helping the Poor 
(High Self-Monitoring Respondents only) 
 
6.5b. Marginal Effect of Candidate Helping the Poor 
(Low Self-Monitoring Respondents only) 
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Figure 6.6. Marginal Effect of Candidate’s Record on Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor (Candidate is non-Partisan) 
 
6.6a. Marginal Effect of Candidate Helping the Poor 
(Democratic Respondents only) 
 
 
6.6b. Marginal Effect of Candidate Helping the Poor 
(Republican Respondents only) 
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Appendix 6.1. Experimental Conditions and Responses to Class Attitude Questions 
 
 
Sympathy for the 
Poor 
Resentment of the 
Rich 
Hurt Poor – Non-Partisan 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Helped Poor – Democrat 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Hurt Poor – Democrat 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Helped Poor – Republican  -0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Hurt Poor – Republican  -0.05 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Helped District – Non-Partisan 0.02 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Hurt District – Non-Partisan -0.05 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.68*** 0.29*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
N 796 770 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ordinary least squares regression coefficients. Standard errors 
in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. Column headings identify the dependent variables. 
Omitted category is Candidate Helped Poor – Non-Partisan Condition. YouGov-Polimetrix 
study; analyses are unweighted (results are robust to weighting).  
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Appendix 6.2 Experimental Condition and Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor  
 
Candidate is Non-Partisan 
Variables Coefficients 
Help Poor Condition 0.39*** 
 (0.15) 
Sympathy for the Poor -0.15 
 (0.11) 
Help Poor Condition X Sympathy for the Poor 0.38** 
 (0.16) 
Party ID (Rep.) 0.15* 
 (0.09) 
Help Poor Condition X Party ID -0.48*** 
 (0.12) 
Ideology (Cons.) 0.44*** 
 (0.10) 
Help Poor Condition X Ideology -0.59*** 
 (0.15) 
Constant 0.24** 
 (0.10) 
N 204 
R-squared 0.38 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ordinary least squares regression coefficients (results are 
robust to ordered logit specification). Standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. 
The dependent variable is support for the candidate. YouGov-Polimetrix study; analyses are 
unweighted (results are robust to weighting). Results are substantively identical when additional 
control variables are included (see Table 6.1 notes for the list) and when those identifying as 
“poor” are excluded.  
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Appendix 6.3 Experimental Condition and Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor  
 
Candidate is Non-Partisan 
Variables Coefficients 
Help District Condition -0.00 
 (0.09) 
Sympathy for the Poor -0.03 
 (0.07) 
Help District Condition X Sympathy for the Poor -0.03 
 (0.10) 
Party ID (Rep.) -0.09 
 (0.05) 
Help District Condition X Party ID 0.06 
 (0.08) 
Ideology (Cons.) 0.08 
 (0.06) 
Help District Condition X Ideology -0.01 
 (0.08) 
Constant 0.55*** 
 (0.07) 
N 184 
R-squared 0.03 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ordinary least squares regression coefficients (results are 
robust to ordered logit specification). Standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. 
The dependent variable is support for the candidate. YouGov-Polimetrix study; analyses are 
unweighted (results are robust to weighting). Results are substantively identical when additional 
control variables are included (see Table 6.1 notes for the list) and when those identifying as 
“poor” are excluded.  
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Appendix 6.4 Experimental Condition and Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor 
 
Candidate is a Democrat 
Variables Coefficients 
Help Poor Condition 0.46*** 
 (0.16) 
Sympathy for the Poor -0.12 
 (0.11) 
Help Poor Condition X Sympathy for the Poor 0.36** 
 (0.17) 
Party ID (Rep.) 0.16* 
 (0.08) 
Help Poor Condition X Party ID -0.59*** 
 (0.14) 
Ideology (Cons.) 0.13 
 (0.10) 
Help Poor Condition X Ideology -0.62*** 
 (0.15) 
Constant 0.37*** 
 (0.10) 
N 204 
R-squared 0.51 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ordinary least squares regression coefficients (results are 
robust to ordered logit specification). Standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. 
The dependent variable is support for the candidate. YouGov-Polimetrix study; analyses are 
unweighted (results are robust to weighting). Results are substantively identical when additional 
control variables are included (see Table 6.1 notes for the list) and when those identifying as 
“poor” are excluded. 
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Appendix 6.5 Experimental Condition and Support for the Candidate, 
by Sympathy for the Poor 
 
Candidate is a Republican 
Variables Coefficients 
Help Poor Condition -0.04 
 (0.17) 
Sympathy for the Poor -0.36*** 
 (0.12) 
Help Poor Condition X Sympathy for the Poor 0.55*** 
 (0.18) 
Party ID (Rep.) 0.33*** 
 (0.11) 
Help Poor Condition X Party ID -0.11 
 (0.15) 
Ideology (Cons.) 0.33*** 
 (0.12) 
Help Poor Condition X Ideology -0.46*** 
 (0.16) 
Constant 0.39*** 
 (0.12) 
N 199 
R-squared 0.37 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ordinary least squares regression coefficients (results are 
robust to ordered logit specification). Standard errors in parentheses. All variables coded 0 to 1. 
The dependent variable is support for the candidate. YouGov-Polimetrix study; analyses are 
unweighted (results are robust to weighting). Results are substantively identical when additional 
control variables are included (see Table 6.1 notes for the list) and when those identifying as 
“poor” are excluded. 
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Chapter Seven  
 
Conclusion: Revisiting American Reactions to Economic Inequality 
 
 The research presented in this dissertation challenges conventional accounts of American 
opinion in an age of entrenched – and widening – economic inequality. While some scholars 
argue that Americans are tolerant of or indifferent to inequality, this argument is often based on 
evidence that rarely meets ordinary individuals on their own terms. That is, rather than using the 
concepts that Americans themselves use to make sense of economic issues in politics, existing 
survey research often relies on complicated questions referring to abstract concepts more familiar 
to intellectual elites than members of the mass public, such as “inequality” and “redistribution.” 
Another strand of research examines responses to survey questions about policies: but this 
approach is also insufficient, as it is unclear from these analyses why Americans support or 
oppose a given policy.  
 Accordingly, I take a different approach, examining open-ended responses of survey 
questions in order to discover the conceptual toolkit (Swidler 1986) Americans bring to bear on 
their considerations of economic issues in the political arena. As expected, I find that discussion 
of “inequality” and “redistribution” is rare. That said, two class groups at the extremes of the 
economic distribution, the poor and the rich, are frequently mentioned, suggesting that attitudes 
toward these groups inform the opinion and political behavior of Americans. 
 I therefore develop and validate measures of attitudes toward these two class groups; the 
results challenge the common account of indifference to economic inequality. On balance, 
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Americans view the poor to have too little and therefore view them with sympathy, while the 
rich are perceived to have too much and are therefore viewed with resentment. Furthermore, 
positive views of the poor and negative views of the rich are not limited to the current historical 
moment in the aftermath of the Great Recession and Occupy Wall Street, dating back at least 
until 1994. Furthermore, sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich, despite a non-trivial 
negative correlation with self-identification as Republican and conservative, exist throughout the 
social strata – they are widespread attitudes held by the old and the young, men and women, 
throughout all regions of the country. 
 I also find that these attitudes influence American policy opinion – as long as the 
beneficiaries and victims of the policy are clear. Powerful associations between these class group 
attitudes and opinion about a variety of public policies persist, across separate datasets, even 
after controls for economic self-interest, partisanship and ideology, core values such as 
egalitarianism and humanitarianism, and demographics. Critically, such associations are not 
evident for those policies for which most Americans do not know the distributive consequences, 
such as the estate tax, the earned income tax credit, the home mortgage interest deduction, and 
the retirement savings deduction. However, among those Americans who are aware that only the 
very richest households are affected by the estate tax, resentment of the rich is brought to bear on 
their opinions about the estate tax, increasing support for the tax. Furthermore, informing 
individuals about the distributive consequences of the earned income tax credit, the home 
mortgage interest deduction, and the retirement savings deduction shifts public opinion in favor 
of the first policy and in opposition to the other two – activating sympathy for the poor and 
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resentment of the rich, and making the public more supportive of downward redistribution and 
less supportive of upward redistribution.  
 Finally, I find that sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich influence Americans’ 
choices of candidates for public office. First, warmth toward the poor relative to the rich is 
associated with preference for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2004 and 2012 (although 
not in 2008) in the nationally representative data of the American National Election Time Series. 
Second, an original experiment finds that a candidate who is likely to help the poor is actually 
more popular – contrary to the claims of previous scholarship – than an otherwise identical 
candidate who is likely to hurt the poor. This is true regardless of whether the candidate is a 
Democrat, a Republican, or non-partisan; it is true for both Democratic and Republican 
respondents; and it is those high on sympathy for the poor that drive this effect, even after 
controlling for the interaction of experimental condition and ideological self-identification. 
Critically, it is not merely the “help/hurt” terminology that is driving these effects, as they are 
absent in additional conditions in which the candidate is likely to help or hurt the district (rather 
than the poor). Finally, these results cannot be easily written off as an artifact of social 
desirability pressures – they are nearly identical among those who are and those who are not 
likely to modify their responses in accordance with social norms.  
 The findings of this project raise an important question about the politics of economic 
inequality in the contemporary United States. If politics determines “who gets what, when and 
how” (Lasswell 1936), it is striking that although a majority of the public believes that the poor 
have less than they deserve while the rich have more, many government activities over the past 
few decades have exacerbated economic inequality (Bartels 2008; Mettler 2011). What are we to 
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make of this apparent disconnect between public opinion and political outcomes, particularly 
given that many Americans bring their class attitudes to bear on their evaluations of political 
entities? One possibility is that wealthy Americans are able to secure disproportionate 
representation, locking in their superior economic position (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2012; Jacobs 
and Skocpol 2005). This may be true under Democratic as well as Republican presidential 
administrations: one recent study concludes that 93% of the income gains in the economic 
recovery in 2010 went to the top 1% of earners (Saez 2012).  
 The results also reinforce Hochschild and Weaver’s (2007) contention that “American 
politics and scholarship are impoverished by paying too little attention to class.” To be sure, 
existing scholarship has made important inroads, particularly in examining the effects of 
socioeconomic status on participation (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) or voting behavior 
(e.g., Bartels 2006). I shift the focus from class position to attitudes about class groups; this 
approach yields the discovery that class plays a more important role in American politics than 
was previously evident. 
 Much work remains to be done. Do certain types of political communication activate, or 
suppress, the connection between attitudes toward these class groups and political preferences? 
Have elite appeals to sympathy for the poor or resentment of the rich waxed and waned along 
with changes in the economic distribution in American history? What types of people are likely 
to feel sympathy for the poor and resentment of the rich, and what conditions change the extent 
to which one views class groups in this way? Future scholarship might examine these questions.  
 Future research might also examine attitudes toward subgroups of the poor and the rich; 
while the present project shows that the poor are viewed sympathetically, previous research 
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shows that certain subgroups of the poor, such as “welfare recipients,” are viewed unfavorably, 
in part due to whites’ racial prejudice (e.g., Gilens 1999). It is possible that many individuals 
think of the rich in meaningful subcategories as well; perhaps some rich are considered “vulture 
capitalists” while others are “job creators.” Furthermore, this project has exclusively examined 
“outgroup” class attitudes; that is, the vast majority of Americans consider themselves to be 
neither poor nor rich. Future research might do more to examine class as an ingroup attitude; to 
what extent do “middle class” and “working class” constitute meaningful identities? Is there such 
a thing as “middle class consciousness,” and does it shape public opinion or political behavior? 
As economic inequality in the United States proceeds apace, much more work needs to be done 
if scholars are to come to terms with the political consequences of attitudes toward class groups.	   	  
 The findings of this project also open questions for the study of group attitudes more 
generally. The dominant paradigm in this approach to American political behavior has been to 
focus on outgroup prejudice: yet in the domain of class we see that one outgroup, the rich, is 
viewed more negatively than another outgroup, the poor, with important political consequences. 
Are other high-status groups viewed with resentment? For example, do some women resent men 
due to continuing gender discrimination, and do some blacks resent whites due to ongoing racial 
inequality? If so, what are the political consequences of these attitudes? Sympathy for additional 
low-status groups, such as the disabled or racial minorities, might also be a potent political force. 
In order to come to terms with the power of group attitudes, we need to accept – and study – the 
wide variety of group attitudes that exist. 
 Finally, the manuscript contributes to a broader question in the study of democratic 
politics: the question of why individuals behave as they do in the political arena. Some scholars 
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portray individuals as self-interested utility maximizers, while others characterize individuals as 
ideologues weighting competing considerations of principle. This research contributes to an 
alternative account: that public opinion and political behavior are dominated by attitudes toward 
social groups. Previous scholarship in this “group-centric” tradition has yielded important 
findings, and the results presented in this dissertation expand this account of mass politics 
considerably, drawing attention to a critical but often-overlooked factor: attitudes about class 
groups. When citizens choose among candidates for public office, they think: who is getting 
what? Do they deserve it? Americans’ policy opinions and votes indicate that on balance, they 
believe the poor to have too little, and the rich too much.  
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